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Abstract: With climate change being one of the largest existential threat’s civilizations has ever 
faced and global cooperation the only conceivable solution, why have the existing MEAs of the 
climate change regime failed? Moreover, why have MEAs in other environmental regimes, such 
as the ozone regime, been so much more successful than MEAs in the climate change regime? 
To investigate this question, I use a theoretical framework of international law and focus on the 
specific way the institutional design of agreements can yield greater success. I define success in a 
two-pronged manner which focuses on participation and compliance. This paper takes a 
comparative analysis between the ozone regime and climate change regime to dissect what 
specific features made the Montreal Protocol so much more successful than the Kyoto Protocol. I 
argue that international relations present one of the largest impediments to a meaningful solution. 
Furthermore, I argue that by balancing legal provisions of flexibility and compliance within an 
agreement such political obstacles can be surmounted. This paper concludes that while you 
cannot simply implant the blueprints of one successful MEA to another, especially across 
regimes, you can incorporate institutional design features which yield both increased ratification 
and adherence. This presents an opportunity for the Paris Agreement to build upon the successful 
features of the Montreal Protocol and incorporate design features which will allow for the 
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Introduction 
 
International environmental law is one of the most nascent systems within the 
international legal order, arguably not beginning until the 1970s with the 1972 Stockholm 
Convention. Although recently formed, the body of international environmental law (IEL) has 
been burgeoning, and within the past 50 years there has been a proliferation of multilateral 
environmental agreements (MEAs). Within the realm of IEL there are a number of regimes 
which comprise different subject areas of concern or cover different regions. Multilateral 
Environmental Agreements often overlap, but unlike some other areas of international law, IEL 
does not have any overarching framework which connects the regimes (Ong 2010). For example, 
the ozone regime and climate change regime are two separate structures, although they overlap 
in area coverage of harmful emissions, they are not connected by an overarching framework. On 
the contrary, the ozone regime intersects with the climate change regime’s concern over 
emissions because of an amendment to the Montreal Protocol known as the Kigali Amendment. 
This amendment explicitly addresses hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs), which are greenhouse gases 
(GHGs)—not an ozone depleting substance (ODS). While interrelated in this manner, the ozone 
and climate change regime are two completely different institutional structures.  
While some MEAs are viewed as successful, the majority of them are considered to be 
flawed (Andresen, Boasson, and Hønneland 2012). Some of the least successful MEAs are those 
under the climate change regime, which is alarming, as for nearly two decades the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change has stressed the urgent need to mitigate the impact 
of climate change and limit temperatures from rising 1.5° C above preindustrial levels. With 
climate change being one of the largest existential threats civilizations have ever faced, and 
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global cooperation the only conceivable solution, why have the existing MEAs of the climate 
change regime failed? Moreover, why have MEAs in other environmental regimes, such as the 
ozone regime, been so much more successful than MEAs in the climate change regime? What 
factors explain the variation in levels of success across environmental regimes and specifically 
MEAs within the climate change regime? 
There are a plethora of reasons that MEAs could be unsuccessful: from lack of global 
support to poor construction or unclear language. Since IEL lacks an overarching framework 
which connects the different regimes, specificity within agreements of exactly what 
environmental factors are under jurisdiction—whether it be reduced GHG emissions or specific 
levels of investment in renewable energy—and to what extent ratifying states must commit 
themselves to said standards, is very important. Many scholars cite lack of clear and precise 
obligations of member states as reasons for failure of international agreements (e.g., Franck 
1988). Other scholars have also highlighted lack of specificity regarding the environmental 
factors themselves as a weakness in MEAs in particular (Young 2011; Etsy and Moffa 2012). To 
illustrate, some agreements may have an objective of limiting the impact of global warming, but 
without clear instructions of how to achieve this, such as limiting a specific emission or chemical 
production, there is a lot of ambiguity for member states as to how to achieve this goal. While 
many see specificity and support as something which comes mainly from the agreements 
themselves, others suggest that domestic institutions need to assist with compliance and 
implementation of treaties (Peel 2020).  
Another cause of failure in international agreements is conflict between key states, or 
what is often the case in IEL, negotiating blocs. The most challenging of obstacles occurs when 
there is a power asymmetry among key negotiators, which can lead to an agreement being 
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plagued by an issue known as the “Lowest-Common-Denominator Problem” (LCD). This is a 
problem in which the structure and goal of an agreement are weakened during negotiations as 
deep commitments are discarded in favor of participation from powerful states, which are often 
averse to binding ambitious obligations (Depledge and Terhalle 2013; Downie 2020, 114-116). 
In other words, an agreement’s commitments are reduced to the lowest possible degree in order 
to gain support from states hesitant to join. This problem is plentiful in MEAs due to the fact that 
most commitments impose high limits or restrictions on state activity, forcing financial loss in 
one sector or investment in another. Such commitments to reductions in an industry are often 
perceived by states as especially disadvantageous if a competing state abstains from ratification 
and are thus under no legal obligation to inhibit their actions (Marcoux 2009; Gomes 2012). For 
the climate change regime this can be particularly undermining to the objective of mitigating the 
planet’s collective warming, as the goal is all but unachievable if the top emitters refuse to ratify 
an agreement and alter their behavior (Stein 2008).  
Furthermore, even if the top emitting states ratify an agreement, if there is not a perceived 
level of fairness in the obligations and contributions of each state—even burden sharing—then 
this might engender unwillingness to comply (Etsy and Moffa 2012). Lack of compliance would 
also undermine an agreement even if high commitments are in place. While there are many 
converging factors which can lead to an agreement’s ultimate failure, I argue that the most 
influential role is that of international conflict. As a consequence of international conflict, an 
agreement could fail to attain ratification from enough key states to achieve its goal, or the 
agreement could become so diluted as to be ineffective—as demonstrated by the lowest-
common-denominator problem.  
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The following review of the literature begins with a discussion of common geopolitical 
obstacles in the global policymaking arena. Next, I discuss the various ways scholars have 
evaluated the success of MEAs and lay out my own criteria for evaluating success. The review 
will then proceed to dissect the current literature on the utility of institutional designs in MEAs 
and their influence on an agreement’s success. The section concludes with current scholars’ 
assessments of the three agreements this paper analyzes: the Montreal Protocol, Kyoto Protocol, 
and Paris Climate Agreement.  
Literature Review  
 
Background International Environmental Laws 
International Relations 
International relations present one of the largest obstacles to a multilateral agreement’s 
success. Marcoux (2009) emphasizes the fact that power asymmetries among negotiating states 
plays an outsized role in agreement construction and more specifically, looks at power 
asymmetry as defined by issue-specific power with regard to environmental goods. Power 
asymmetry is attributed by many to causing MEA goals to be weakened, and ambitions to fall 
prey to the lowest-common-denominator rule (Downie 2020, 115). Similarly, others note that to 
understand MEAs one must understand the deeper geopolitical trends and conflicts that surround 
them (Depledge and Terhalle 2013; Gomes 2012). Depledge and Terhalle (2013), for example, 
examine the “great-power-politics” and specific dynamics between countries which are most 
determinative and possibly detrimental to achieving success. Their paper concluded that the 
resurging relationship between China and the US, and their collective failures to work within the 
existing global governance structure, has prevented the institutional redesign necessary to 
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confront climate change. It is more difficult to secure compliance if the perceived cost of the 
treaty is higher than the benefit (Faure 2020). Similarly to Depledge and Terhale (2013), 
Martimore and San-Zantman (2016), note that one of the most prominent contentious 
international relationships is between the US and China. Their rank as two of the top three GHG 
emitting states, makes it nearly impossible to have a successful climate change MEA without 
their participation. For example, Sunstein (2007) notes that one of the main reasons Kyoto was 
set up for failure was the fact that it never secured ratification from the US. Even after 
participating in negotiations, the US never ratified the agreement because they perceived it as 
detrimental to the US economy and not strict enough on developing countries. Without key 
players ratifying an agreement, it is difficult to achieve the aggregate reduction of emissions 
necessary to limit warming.  
 The often antagonistic geopolitical dynamic between the Global North and the Global 
South presents another determinative role in the negotiations and outcomes of MEAs. The main 
point of friction between these two groups is that the developed northern countries have 
historically been top emitters, producing the most greenhouse gases, and by virtue, exacerbating 
climate change the most (Najam 2020). These countries have also largely established their 
wealth and development precisely because of their ability to burn fossil fuels and produce such 
emissions. Conversely, many environmental agreements limit developing countries from 
producing emissions or burning fossil fuels, in essence preventing them from benefiting from 
fossil fuels and developing their countries in the same way the developed countries have.  It is 
for this reason that many states in the Global South view international environmental regulation 
“as an effort to sabotage the south’s development aspirations” (Najam 2020, 53). Other scholars 
point to the resentment the south has of the north as a point of hesitancy developing countries 
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have to joining MEAs, which is one reason the now prominent principle of common but 
differentiated responsibility was developed (CBDR) (Melkas 2007; Najam 2020; Etsy and Moffa 
2012). As Melkas (2007) elaborates on, she sees “substantive equality” as a more influential 
factor to the effectiveness of MEAs, particularly in regard to their cost-effectiveness and the 
relationship between developed and developing states. 
When examining the power dynamic between the US and China, it is valuable to note 
that this relationship can also be viewed as north vs south, even though China is considered to be 
a part of the emerging economies, or BRICS, and is viewed by many to be one of the world’s 
leading powers. BRICS is an acronym for: Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa. 1  
China still remains in the UN negotiating bloc of the G77—a group of developing states 
primarily in the southern hemisphere—and notably will voice concerns of the developing states, 
protecting their collective interests during climate agreement negotiations (Depledge and 
Terhalle 2013; Najam 2020). China’s dual interest in negotiations, as both a world power and 
representative of the Global South, demonstrates the reality Marcoux and Urpelainen (2013),  
observed that, “while states do design international law to solve cooperation problems, states’ 
interests are rarely confined to this. States also negotiate international law in the shadow of 
domestic and international political pressures” (164).   
How to Evaluate “Success” 
Global cooperation is practically required to address climate change, as no state can 
adequately confront the existential threat on its own. Thus, it is imperative that as an 
international community, countries are able to come together and commit themselves to effective 
 
1These other states are all high emission states and relevant to the discussion of geopolitical relationship in MEAs, 
however this paper will not look at any of these in depth, aside from China. 
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agreements in order to improve the success of MEAs in the climate change regime and limit the 
catastrophic consequences of climate change. “Success” means different things to different 
scholars. Some researchers define success as, inclusive of compliance, efficiency, and 
effectiveness (Rosen 2015). Others use the term success and effectiveness interchangeably to 
mean an agreement’s ability to meet its goals (Esty, Moffa 2012; Young 2011). Still, others 
define success in a more elaborate manner in which an agreement secures participation from 
states, encourages and enforces compliance, and also secures “deep commitments” (Hovi, 
Skodvin, Stine 2013; Liverani 2010). In departure from this last approach, I define success in a 
two-pronged manner which focuses on participation and compliance. First, with regard to 
participation, a successful agreement must attain widespread ratification from countries, most 
importantly, ratification by top emitters and world powers. Second, specific to compliance, 
agreements must achieve their environmental goals, namely emissions reductions through the 
adherence to ambitious obligations from key states. While some scholars have evaluated success 
of MEAs in similar terms, I deviate from previous research by evaluating success based on their 
overall performance—from negotiations to countries’ individual results after entry into force. In, 
contrast to this all-encompassing assessment, other scholars have primarily looked exclusively at 
one aspect of the agreement process at a time, such as negotiations, ratification, or compliance 
(Faure 2020; Savaşan 2019; Von Stein 2008).  
Although effectiveness and success are closely linked and often used interchangeably, I 
am intentionally not mixing the two, as I see them as different ends. To elaborate, an agreement 
can be effective in meeting state obligations and still not attain the overarching goal of the 
agreement, such as stabilizing emissions enough to lower temperatures to an inhabitable level. It 
should also be noted, that while having a high number of ratifying states is more advantageous 
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for success, the “weight” of the states plays a crucial factor, as in their degree of contribution to 
the environmental problem and their clout in the international arena (Sandler 2020). For 
example, if 150 states ratify a treaty, but those states do not include the top emitters—such as the 
US, Australia, India, China, Canada, and the EU—then the success of the agreement, even if all 
states fulfilled their obligations, would be severely limited by the extent of their collective 
emissions and the goal, by virtue, would be undermined. While most scholars acknowledge this 
reality and point to it as a failure of many MEAs, Young (2011) argues that above all else the 
design of the treaty itself is most consequential to an agreement’s success.  
Institutional Design Features 
Many others have pointed to agreement design as a significant determinant in an 
agreement’s success (Marcoux 2009; Young 2016; Martimort and Sand-Zantman 2016; Kim, 
Tanaka, and Matsuoka 2017). Inversely, many have accused the Kyoto Protocol of being riddled 
with design flaws and an ultimate contributor in its failure (Sandler 2016, 353; Rosen 2015, 31). 
Furthermore, Young (2011) argues that design features are so powerful, as to supersede the 
actual strength of the problem for which the MEA addresses. Young argues that even problems 
considered more difficult than others, such as the daunting task of mitigating the risk of climate 
change, can achieve the same level of success as a seemingly smaller environmental issue could 
as long as it is well designed. The design of an agreement is a delicate act though, as it needs to 
encourage both elements of the two-pronged approach I am using to evaluate the success of 
MEAs: both maximize participation from key states and achieve environmental results through 
state commitments. This paper refers to institutional design features as a comprehensive term 
which includes the balanced legal mechanisms in MEAs, whether they be for compliance or 
flexibility, or otherwise.  
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First and foremost to this definition, an MEA needs enough signatories to collectively 
represent sufficient reductions to achieve the agreement’s environmental goals. Not only is high 
participation required, but it is important to have top emitting countries ratify MEAs, otherwise it 
would take many, many smaller contributors taking action for an agreement to be at all effective. 
More importantly, greater participation is required to create an equitable long-term solution 
(Liverani 2010; Aakra, Hoyi, and Tora 2013; Young 2011; Rosen 2015). However, states often 
choose to abstain from ratifying MEAs due to political conflict between states or perceived 
disadvantage when joining an agreement as described above. The climate change regime is 
extremely susceptible to this, as the act of abating state emissions or environmentally damaging 
actions most certainly comes at an additional expense or economic loss. Each state perceives 
varying degrees of personal costs for every MEA which creates an even more daunting challenge 
(Martimort and Sand-Zantman 2016, 669-670). If one state perceives their individual cost as 
higher than another state’s, this could lead to intense conflict. 
One strategy to increase state participation is incorporating flexibility provisions within 
MEAs. Such provisions can make agreements more appealing from a state’s perspective because 
of the autonomy they give states in shaping their own commitments. Although there are some 
mixed results on the effectiveness of flexibility provisions in MEAs, they have been determined 
by many to improve the overall results of an agreement, particularly by incentivizing higher rates 
of ratification (Boockmann and Thurner 2006; Koremenos 2001, 2005; Faure 2020; Marcoux 
2009; Stein 2008). I define flexibility provisions in a more general manner, similarly to Kim, 
Matsuoka, and Tanaka (2017), in which “flexibility embraces not only mechanisms such as the 
‘emission trading systems’ of the Kyoto Protocol, but also procedures that can influence IEA 
implementation (80).” I do this in order to avoid confusion with the Kyoto flexible mechanisms 
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which I will be discussing in my case analysis of the agreement in chapter four. 2 Furthermore, 
some scholars have broken down flexibility provisions into different categories of: adaptive, 
interpretive, and transformative (Marcoux 2009; Kim, Matsuoka, and Tanaka 2017 ).3 4 Marcoux 
(2009) notes that it is essential to disaggregate types of flexibility, as they are used strategically 
under different circumstances and for various purposes often as a solution to cooperation 
problems. Marcoux also notes that the inclusion of flexibility is correlated with international 
relations, particularly when there is a large power asymmetry between negotiating states.  
It is true that “sometimes the political impact of a treaty will depend not so much on 
whether all parties to it subscribe to exactly the same package of rights and obligations, but on 
whether the treaty is acceptable to as many states as possible” (Voyiakis 2010, 109). However, 
high rates of participation in MEAs, achieved through too much flexibility without compliance 
measures, may incentivize non-adherence to targets, making the MEAs objective unattainable 
and all but worthless. In this vein, many scholars argue that effective compliance provisions are 
needed in environmental agreements (Faure 2020; Martimort and Sand-Zantman 2016; Goetyen 
and Maes 2011). Aakra, Hovi, and Skodvin (2013), have focused particularly on the ways 
compliance mechanisms can improve climate change negotiations and deliver more detailed 
enforcement measures, which in turn, increase success. Young (2011) argues that compliance 
mechanisms are not the most important aspect to an agreement’s success, especially if the regime 
is not fundamentally regulatory in nature.  
 
2  It should be noted that some scholars refer to what I call flexibility provisions as flexibility mechanisms when 
referring to their use outside of the Kyoto Protocol (Downie 2020; Melkas 2007; Sunstein 2007). 
3 This paper will use these general types of flexibility as a categorizing framework but will assign a more specific 
typology in chapter 1 and elaborate on the definitions and their applications.  
4 Kim, Matsuoka, and Tanaka only divide flexibility into the two categories of adaptive and transformative, leaving 
out interpretive flexibility as Marcoux does. However, I believe that interpretive flexibility is a distinct and 
important category of its own.  
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It is noteworthy that Marcoux and Urpelainen (2013) concluded that strict treaty 
provisions or compliance mechanisms are more likely to exist when states perceive that they will 
not be enforced. This aligns with a realist perspective that states do what is in their best interest, 
and a state might not agree to compliance mechanisms or punishment if they (i) thought they 
would be liable to punishment if they could not live up to demanding obligations or (ii) if they 
thought the punishment would be enforced and injurious to them. However, this paradox reveals 
the need of a balance between compliance and flexibility—flexibility, on the one hand, allows 
states to feel comfortable and confident in their capabilities of fulfilling obligations, while 
compliance ensures states live up to these commitments. Goeteyn and Maes (2011) discuss the 
ways in which compliance mechanisms have taken over as the preferred dispute settlement 
procedure in MEAs, however, they argue that the best compliance mechanisms are those which 
have standing commitments and support, not just ad hoc bodies. They elaborate that this 
universality would ensure that a state party to a treaty involved in a non-compliance procedure 
would not be able to avoid the process ( Goeteyn and Maes 2011, 816). 
Agreements 
Not all environmental regimes are unsuccessful. The ozone regime, which is widely regarded 
as successful (Downie 2020; Faure 2020; Sunstein 2007; DeSombre 2001; Young 2011; Savaşan 
2019), is perhaps the most notable exception. Such differences in success across regimes, begs 
the question, what made the ozone regime and specifically the Montreal Protocol, so successful 
and other MEAs not? To begin this investigation, it is necessary to analyze the Montreal Protocol 
as one of the trademark successes of international environmental agreements. DeSombre (2001) 
notes that the negotiations for establishing the treaty were particularly effective for working out 
differences amongst states and importantly confronting uncertainty with concrete measures. She 
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goes on to acknowledge much of the success lies in the design of the treaty to allow for continual 
and considerable adjustments as new information was available through the use of conventions 
and protocols. Other scholars have also noted that the negotiations, in addition to the Meeting of 
the Parties (MOP)—which can be thought of as equivalent to the Conference of the Parties 
(COP)—were of particular importance (Downie 2020; Sandler 2017; Savaşan 2019). Downie 
(2020) distinguishes binding rules as the most important byproduct of such negotiations, further 
noting that with the Montreal Protocol the most influential of such binding rules related to state’s 
emissions reductions, rather than technical or financial assistance (109-110). 
 In addition to effective negotiations, why does ozone stand out as an effective regime in 
comparison to climate change? Many have noted that the economics of ozone made it 
particularly less burdensome in the long run to phase out ozone depleting substances (ODS) 
because of direct substitutes readily available (Gareau 2010; Sunstein 2007; Sandler 2017). 
However, DeSombre (2001) remarks that, on the contrary, what made the negotiations so 
exceptional was the fact that initially there was no substitute for CFCs readily available and any 
existing potentials very expensive (50). With that being said, DeSombre (2001) does 
acknowledge that there is still a cost to committing to the agreement. She suggests that what 
makes the cost more palatable to states, particularly the developed states, is that the depleted 
ozone was not only a direct result of the north’s actions, but also the consequences directly 
negatively impacted them. Sunstein (2007) supports this view, noting that “to the United States, 
the monetized benefits of the Montreal Protocol dwarfed the monetized costs, and hence the 
circumstances were extremely promising for America Support” (5). Furthermore, the physical 
properties of GHGs compared to ODS makes it a more difficult problem to isolate blame and 
assign just consequences. Sandler (2017) suggests that the nature of climate change and GHG is 
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more difficult to contain, partly because it is more susceptible to transboundary movement. 
Although the differences in scope and economics of the two regimes and associated 
environmental issues are stark, Young (2011) deviates from other scholars in his take that these 
disparities do not inherently predispose agreements to be more or less likely to succeed.  
 As for the climate change regime, it is advantageous to look at both the regime as a 
whole, and then break down the specific agreements I am analyzing in this paper: the Kyoto 
Protocol and the Paris Climate Agreement. Since the Kyoto Protocol can be thought of as the 
predecessor to the Paris Agreement, I will discuss it and its design features first. Additionally, 
because the Kyoto Protocol has already undergone its first commitment period and the Paris 
Agreement has yet to undergo its first global stocktake, it is easier to assess its outcome.5 In 
comparison to the Montreal Protocol, the Kyoto Protocol has been received by world leaders, 
scholars, and the public alike, as if not a failure, than drastically falling short of the multilateral 
agreement needed to meet the moment and challenge (Martimort and Sand-Zantman 2016; 
Melkas 2007; Sandler 2017; Sunstein 2007; Rosen 2015; Savaşan 2019, Stein 2008). There are 
many different attributes which have led to the shortcomings of the Kyoto Protocol. For one, 
many see ratified states’ commitments as insecure and shallow, either due to a lack of 
compliance measure, or for its non-binding obligations for non-Annex I countries (Martimort 
and Sand-Zantman 2016). Others see the differentiation between Annex and non-Annex states as 
flawed for inadequately addressing the inequalities amongst states (Melkas 2007). Melkas (2007) 
goes on to explain that the Kyoto Flexible Mechanisms created a cost effectiveness incentive 
which shifts the emphasis from assisting developing countries, to skirting personal responsibility 
 
5 The global stocktake, as articulated in article 14 of the Paris Agreement, includes a global assessment of the 
agreement’s progress and the individual contributions of the member parties to the agreement. This oversight 
provision was determined to be conducted every 5 years in accordance with the decision made at CP21. 
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of state emissions. States exploit the cost effectiveness of CMD in developing states and rely on 
it as a cheaper alternative than investing in projects in their own countries. 6 Additionally, this 
creates a problem in which developing countries struggle to invest in emission reductions in their 
own country, as the most affordable and cost-effective options have already been capitalized on 
by developed Annex-1 countries (Melkas 2007, 263-265; Sandler 2017, 353).   
 A question one may ask themselves is, why did Kyoto fail when it was said to have been 
based on a template akin to Montreal, which itself was successful? One reason, aside from those 
mentioned above, is the failure of key states to completely commit themselves, such as Canada, 
Russia, and the US (Sandler 2017).7 In a close analysis of why states, such as these, abstained 
from ratification, or withdrew, Sunstein (2007, 5) writes: 
If the US complied with the Kyoto Protocol on its own, those analyses suggested that it 
would spend a great deal and gain relatively little. If all parties complied, some of the 
most influential analyses suggested that the US would nonetheless be a net loser. Because 
of the distinctive properties of the agreement, it was not at all clear that the world as a 
whole had more to gain than to lose from the Kyoto Protocol. 
 
This speaks to the ongoing challenge of international relations as one of the greatest impediments 
to the success of an MEA. The US saw itself as a net loser in the Kyoto Protocol, even though 
some of its adversaries committed, however notably missing from binding commitments were 
the emerging powerhouses of China and India (Sunstein qqtd. President Bush 2000, 28). Rosen 
(2015) also believes that the high opportunity of Kyoto was one of its fatal flaws and argues that 
its design mechanisms only exacerbated the issue. Rosen speaks to the fact that the structure of 
 
6 CDM stands for Clean Development Mechanism, one of Kyoto’s three main flexibility mechanisms. 
7  While a key player in negotiations, the US never ratified the Kyoto Protocol. Although both Russia and Canada 
initially ratified it, Canada later withdrew and Russia never agreed to the second commitment period.  
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Annex I and non-Annex I countries put pressure exclusively on top emitters, incentivizing free 
riding from developing states who could still contribute considerably to emissions without 
consequence.  
 The Paris Agreement on the other hand has elicited a more varied reception, partially 
because most assessment was speculative in nature as the outcome is yet to be born out. For this 
reason, some have calculated various possible degrees of warming the agreement could produce 
if it is observed and more or less strictly adhered to (Allen et. al. 2018). Others have analyzed 
different facets of the agreement aside from strictly emission calculations. Many such scholars 
view Paris as a mixed bag. Some see the overall intention and unique bottom-up approach as 
promising, but are still unsure if the agreement and member states can actually deliver on their 
promises (Duit, Linnér, Nilsson, and Jernnäs 2019; Young 2016; Falkner 2016). Kinley (2019) 
notes that the COP which itself set the framework for the Paris Agreement, COP-21, was one of 
the most highly regarded and effective COPs on record and posits that this success is a hopeful 
indicator.  
 On the contrary, some regard the agreement as ungrounded in our climate reality, with 
the agreement itself as a botched attempt to solve an existential issue without any concrete 
measures (Spash 2019). Similarly, Clémencon (2016) ultimately does not think Paris has enough 
of a blueprint to move forward in achieving temperature stabilization—even with such 
aspirational goals, they are just that, aspirational. This does leave room for future ratcheting up 
of commitments through future COPs and subsidiary bodies oversight (Young 2016; Savaşan 
2019, 229). 
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 This paper will proceed from this existing literature by expounding on what elements 
lead to an environmental agreement’s success or failure. Chapter two will continue to lay down a 
theoretical foundation for which I am analyzing the agreement and explain the international 
relations and geopolitical dynamics as well as their influence on the construction of agreements. 
This chapter will also introduce a typology for the institutional design provisions and flexibility 
and compliance which I am investigating. Chapter three uses this theoretical framework to 
unpack the ozone regime with particular attention paid to the Montreal Protocol and pivotal 
negotiations. Chapter four will continue in this vein, but switch focus to the climate change 
regime and the Kyoto Protocol. Chapter five directly compares the two regimes and analyzes 
which elements yielded more success for the ozone or climate change regime respectively, and 
why. It will also assess the outcome of the agreements by graphing emissions data on ODS and 
CO2 for key states for the ozone regime and climate change regime respectively. To conclude, 
chapter six will briefly address the Paris Agreement and its design features, remarking on what 
we have learned from Montreal and Kyoto and the ways Paris can be improved upon to yield 
higher success.  
  I am contributing to the literature by defining my own assessment of success and then 
evaluating it by looking at the agreements institutional design, key negotiations, and lastly 
quantitatively through relevant emissions. All the while, I am using an underpinning of 
international relations as a context for which agreements are made and can contribute to their  
success or failure. While legal provisions such as flexibility and compliance have been looked at 
separately, I am taking the unique approach of creating my own typology for the two and 
analyzing how they can be balanced within agreements to both subvert international conflict, 
thus increasing the number of ratifying states, and improve compliance with environmental 
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commitments. The Kyoto Protocol and Montreal Protocol have been compared in the past, but 
never in this particular manner of institutional design and legal provisions of flexibility and 
compliance.  
Chapter 2 ~ Background on IEL and Institutional Design Features 
Important Dates 
 
1972-   The Stockholm Conference on the Human Environment 
The United Nations Environment Program is established 
1985-   Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer 
1987-   The United Nations report, Our Common Future Published 
1989-   Montreal Protocol enters into force 
1992-   Rio Conference on Environment and Development 
UNFCC is established 
2000-   UN Millennium Declaration 
2002-   World Summit on Sustainable Development in Johannesburg 
2005-   Kyoto Protocol enters into force 
2016-   Paris Agreement enters into force 
 
Background on IL  
The founding principles of international law effect how states view, create, and adhere to 
international law today. At the core of these principles is the supremacy of state sovereignty, as 
formally established by the Treaty of Westphalia after the 30 year war in 1648, and constantly 
redefined in international law since. Although it seems that international law would be 
antithetical to state sovereignty, this is avoided by the central tenant of international law, which 
is that it is established voluntarily and collectively among states (Cali 2010, 5). States are only 
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liable to agreements which they consent to, and only to other states which have also consented to 
the same agreement or binding law, whether bilateral or multilateral (Anghie 2010, 53). 
Therefore, in the MEAs being analyzed in this paper, and MEAs generally, it is only member 
states which can be held accountable, which is why ratification is the first step towards a 
successful agreement.  
Since it is the choice of a state whether or not they ratify any international agreements, 
one might ask, why would a state want to ratify an international agreement? Also, what gives 
international law legitimacy in the first place? To answer the former question, one of the main 
reasons may be reciprocity. Reciprocity is the regulation of states’ behavior with each other on 
the basis that certain actions will be mutually returned between the parties in obligation. With 
reciprocity comes predictability, which establishes the basis of collective security, another 
related, but distinct, catalyst for the establishment of international law. Collective security is the 
vested interest states have in working together to achieve a collective goal and set regulations 
that would otherwise not exist—especially from global threats, such as climate change (Anghie 
2010, 58). When a binding multilateral agreement is made, it hypothetically ensures that all 
states’ actions towards each other will be reciprocated, which in turn can create a great degree of 
collective security. As mentioned in the literature review, the idea of reciprocity has been 
adjusted to take into account states’ varying degree of capability, which is why the principle of 
common but differentiated responsibility (CBDR) has become a standard in MEAs rather than 
identical contributions of reciprocity.8 This adjusted notion of equality has emerged from the 
broader principle of equity in international law, and is imperative for agreements to consider if 
 
8 Although there is no overarching framework which connects MEAs, the UNFCC is used as guidance for many 
current agreements in the climate change regime. At the frameworks core is an emphasis on common but 
differentiated responsibility (Preamble, Arts. 3, 4, UNFCCC). 
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developing countries are to participate; gaining support from developing states is central to a 
successful climate MEA achieving widespread participation (Peel 2020, 86). 
 With regard to MEAs in particular, it is impractical for reciprocity to not take into 
account varying degrees of states’ capabilities, and in the instance of climate change, the degree 
to which each state has contributed to the problem. As Melkas points out: 
Thus, by turning attention away from strict sovereign equality in order to take into 
account other factors, differential treatment aims at adopting a substantive equality – 
equal opportunities or benefits. These cannot be achieved through reliance on sovereign 
equality, as states are inherently unequal. The differences between states would otherwise 
render formal equality useless or even counter- productive. Thus, substantive equality 
refers here to situations where sovereign equality gives way to accommodating non-legal 
factors, the factual circumstances that states may find themselves in. (Melkas 2007, 278) 
  
Substantive equality is at the core of CBDR and has been an aim of MEAs for decades, visible 
through the Annex structure in the Kyoto Protocol and Nationally Determined Contributions in 
the Paris Agreement. What is not yet agreed upon, is how to weigh states’ contributions and 
structure commitments in a way that makes them both equally effective. 
Expert international lawyer, Thomas Franck, believes that while there are other factors 
which prompt states to ratify and adhere to international agreements, it is ultimately a law’s 
perceived level of legitimacy which compels states to ratify and abide by international 
agreements.9 Legitimacy is based on four main components: determinacy, symbolic validation, 
coherence, and adherence (Franck 1988, 712). Determinacy is the degree to which “the text [of 
an agreement] is able to convey a clear message, to appear transparent in the sense that one can 
 
9 While some, such as a realist might argue that legitimacy is irrelevant, and only a state’s perceived benefit matters, 
one overlooks the possibility that legitimacy is a part of a state’s calculation in their benefits.  
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see through the language to the meaning” (Franck 1988, 713). This is straight forward in the 
sense that, if the language of a law is lofty, and the meaning of it allusive, states are less likely to 
be regulated by them. However, when the meaning is clear and the expectations laid out 
obviously, “those addressed will know precisely what is expected of them, which is a necessary 
first step towards compliance” (Franck 1988, 713).  Symbolic validation helps give determinacy 
to the cultural and anthropological dimensions of an agreement and is slightly more difficult to 
tangibly conceptualize. 10  The other two aspects of legitimacy can be defined as follows—
coherence is the degree to which a law reinforces and works with existing respected laws; “It 
encompasses the further notion that a rule, standard or validating ritual gathers force if it is seen 
to be connected to a network of other rules by an underlying general principle” (Franck 1988, 
741).  For example, if many agreements confirm the same belief, rule, or obligation, then it 
almost sets a standard for which states are less likely to deviate as the agreements jointly create a 
surmounting evidence of its authority.11 Finally, there is adherence, “used here to mean the 
vertical nexus between a single primary rule of obligation ("cross on the green; stop on the red") 
and a pyramid of secondary rules about how rules are made, interpreted and applied: rules, in 
other words, about rules” (Franck 1988, 751).  
The ultimate objective of the international legal order is to provide a preeminent structure 
for various members of the international community to cooperate on collective problems, create 
norms, regulate behavior, and resolve issues (Voyiakis 2010, 102). Just as with domestic law, 
international law fulfills legislative, administrative, and adjudicative functions (Peel 2020, 69). 
 
10 While symbolic validation is one of Franck’s four main aspects of legitimacy, it is not a focal point in the analysis 
of MEA’s in this paper. 
11 As mentioned in the beginning of this paper, international environmental law is plagued by either region or issue 
specific treaties, which make it difficult for them to establish a high level of coherence among each other. 
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These functions jointly establish the norms and commitments which conform to such standards 
and ultimately place limits on state activities and their impact on the environment. To further 
understand the legitimacy and roles of international law, one must understand the agreement 
construction process and the international relations which characterize it. 
International Relations 
 As with all international law, IEL falls within the backdrop of international relations and 
the geopolitical dynamics which shade every stage of the global policy making process—from 
negotiations to ratifications and enactment. The scale of participation in the MEAs analyzed in 
this paper brings with it intricate relationships between many different member states, but one of 
the most influential geopolitical dynamic is between the Global North and the Global South. This 
can be characterized as the division between the developed and developing countries, with the 
wealthier developed countries primarily falling within the northern hemisphere—with the 
exception of a few countries such as Australia—and the poorer developing countries laying in 
the southern hemisphere. While this division is not as monolithic as binary, it does have salience 
and is evident through negotiating blocs at the UN.  
 Historically the north has been the primary contributor to many of the environmental 
problems IEL covers, most notably climate change. The north and developed countries have 
been the largest contributors to GHGs and continue to be so even with reductions. This 
corresponds to the polluter pays principle, which like CBDR has been a standard in the 
international environmental arena—taking hold even earlier since introduced in the Stockholm 
Convention and adopted by the UN Environmental Program. As the name implies, the state 
culpable for environmental degradation should be the one responsible for any resources 
expended in the clean-up (Andersen et al. 2012, 12; Ong 2010, 313). This is another factor, along 
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with CBDR, which places a larger amount of responsibility on the north to take charge with 
higher levels of commitment in the environmental agreements covered in this paper.  
 While there are other groupings in the international relations arena, and various subsets 
which reinforce the division of the south versus north, such as the BRICS or NAM, it is most 
apparent through the G77 bloc at the UN. BRICS is an acronym which stands for the informal 
collection of emerging global economies: Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa. NAM, 
or The Non-aligned Movement, is an officially established group which pushed for developing 
issues to be at the center of international development discussion, although it has withered in 
recent decades due to a lack of stable leadership. The G77 is a coalition of 134 developing 
member states of the UN, and has become a principal vehicle of advocacy and support for 
developing countries. The block provides a platform to bolster the voices of developing countries 
and their collective concern to counter the power of the developed north (Betsill and Fiske 2020, 
277; Najam 2020, 247-250). One might assume that as states develop and grow it is unrealistic 
that 134 states would agree on “collective” concerns, however, “empirical evidence suggests, at 
least until now, that even when developing countries have different national priorities on specific 
issues in global negotiations—something that should not be surprising—they almost always 
choose to pursue these interests within the framework of the southern collective, the G-77” 
(Najam 2020, 249). This is particularly interesting when looking at certain states, such as China, 
which is now a world superpower and arguably has just as much national interest in principles 
which apply to states of the Global North. This juxtaposition has given China a duality of power 
as both a representative of the Global South and a main contributor to environmental 
degradation—de facto virtually requiring it to commit itself to any MEA in order for it to be 
successful in achieving its collective aim (Marcoux and Urpelainen 2013). 
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As China has risen to power and usurped the US as the top emitter of GHG in the world, 
another dynamic of contention has formed between the US and China. Terhalle and Depledge 
(2013) consider this international relationship a dominant and influential conflict amongst the 
great-powers and observe that, 
both countries, at least in their rhetoric, have insisted that any greater enmeshment is 
dependent on that of the other country. It is well known that the US has consistently 
claimed, for economic reasons, that it will not sign up to legally binding commitments 
that do not also apply to other ‘major emitters’ (i.e. China). Likewise, China is well 
versed in the refrain that developed countries (i.e. the US) bear the most responsibility for 
the cumulative emissions in the atmosphere, and thus must take the lead in addressing the 
problems before developing countries (i.e. China itself) take on stronger obligations. 
(578-579) 
 
Other states outside of the US and China have similar tensions regarding how much each state 
should be contributing to MEAs. While it is now regularly agreed upon that CBDR should be at 
the center of MEAs, and the south has tacitly agreed to commit itself to contribute to some 
extent, it is often a point of dispute between how far this differentiation should apply. While the 
south wants to ensure that it has adequate space for its future development, this does not 
necessarily mean they should be exempt from obligations. This is one main critique of the Annex 
system used in the Kyoto Protocol, which only constrained Annex-1 developed countries to have 
binding commitments. All of the developing countries, even emerging economies and leading 
emitters, such as China, were exempt from any binding regulations. Alternatively, the south has 
criticized the north for failing to live up to commitments in the past. This historical lack of 
follow through fuels more apprehension from the south when engaging in future agreements with 
the north, out of fear that they will continue to fall short on their duties (Najam 2020, 263). 
Concerns over commitment relate directly to the problem of free riding; this occurs when states 
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gain the benefits of an agreement without paying their fair share of the cost (Downie 2020, 113). 
Free riding can occur at the intensive and extensive margins. Free riding at the intensive margin 
entails ratifying countries reducing their efforts to fight pollution, whereas when it occurs at the 
extensive margins states chose not to join an agreement all together and continue with business 
as usual (BAU) (Martimort and Sand-Zantman 2016, 670). 
 The difference between the two types of free riding divulges the often-inherent tradeoff 
between achieving a high number of ratifying states and the depth of commitment made by the 
ratifying states. While a main aim of an agreement is ratification, the obligations also need to be 
realistic to ensure that states will actively participate in them. Creating “realistic” obligations 
often results in an agreement being reduced to the lowest possible level acceptable by states, 
especially key players, in order to appease their concern and gain their commitment (Downie 
2020, 114-116; Stein 2008). This so-called Lowest Common Denominator (LCD) problem is 
even more detrimental when unequal adjustment cost of behavior is factored in. All 
environmental problems can be considered in economic terms of negative externalities. The 
economic burden of correcting for these externalities is felt more by states with heavy investment 
in harmful industries, causing them to have an unequal adjustment cost of an agreement than 
other states which do not have such investments (Downie 2020, 119; Martimort and Sand-
Zantman 2016, 669-670). For this reason, taking a closer look at the policy making process is 
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Global Policy Making Process 
Negotiations 
Within IEL there are a number of regimes; the two this paper examines are the climate 
change regime and ozone regime. Regimes cannot be distilled into any one agreement or policy, 
but rather are a system of norms, rules, guidelines and principles (Downie 2020, 128). Within 
these regimes exists a number of international treaties which are constructed following the 
guidelines codified in the Vienna Convention on The Law of Treaties (VCLT). This would be 
considered a secondary law of process under Franck’s rules of legitimacy. The process of 
making treaties roughly follows three steps: (1) Negotiation, (2) Signature, and (3) Ratification 
(Voyiakis 2010, 110).12 However, this brings up the point of binding versus non-binding 
agreements. Some agreements are binding, in which states have a legal obligation to uphold their 
agreed role. On the other hand, others are non-binding and include suggested behavior or norms. 
This differentiation between non-binding and binding agreements is comparable to soft versus 
hard law, although in IL it is often not such a strict binary distinction. Additionally, certain 
legally binding agreements may not impose binding restrictions on member states, but are still 
binding in and of themselves. 
Within IL, particularly IEL, it is common for regimes to incorporate an encompassing 
framework which does not usually include specific binding commitments, but upon which 
further protocols establish binding commitments in accordance to the standards and objectives 
laid down in the framework. This is commonly known as the Framework-Protocol Model or 
 
12 There is of course more nuance in treaty construction than these three steps and as Voyiakis articulates, it can 
even further be broken down into five components: negotiation, adoption, authentication, expression of consent to 
be bound, and entry into force. 
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framework-protocol approach (Peel 2020, 78; Betsill and Fiske 2020, 276).13  This framework-
protocol model can be used to reinforce general principles of environmental practices without a 
steep initial obligation. Such obligations can be refined and eased into after the establishment of 
a framework through one or more related agreements. While some might argue that this model 
does not have a lot of coherency—allowing for many overlapping but never clearly combined 
agreements—it does allow for flexibility in regimes to correct course and create new more 
effective agreements.  
The salience of the legal bindingness in MEA’s success is debatable. Some argue that 
legally binding MEAs show “a significant improvement of environment performance” (Kim, 
Tanaka, and Matsuoka 2017, 77), while others report that whether an agreement is binding or not 
has a negligible impact on performance (Martimort and Sand-Zantman 2016, 696). Many fault 
the uneven binding nature of the Kyoto Protocol on only Annex-I states as a reason for its failure 
(Rosen 2015; Sunstein 2007).14 I argue that falling at either extreme end of the spectrum—
absolute hard law binding commitments with no autonomy versus completely soft non-binding 
law—is an ineffective approach to constructing an MEA. As Abbott and Snidal (2000) have 
concluded, I agree that soft law is just as valid as hard law, and furthermore, is valuable in its 
own right, not just as a “steppingstone to hard law” (456). I believe that for addressing complex 
environmental challenges, a more nuanced approach is necessary, and flexibility is required as 
 
13 Most notably the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change or UNFCCC, which recognizes 
anthropogenic climate change as a collective problem which should be addressed through global cooperation. While 
it sets a general goal of stabilizing green house gas emissions, it does not give clear guidelines to do so or state 
specific commitments. Further agreements, such as the Kyoto Protocol and the Paris Climate Accord set these 
standards. See, https://unfccc.int/process-and-meetings/the-convention/what-is-the-united-nations-framework-
convention-on-climate-change, for more. 
14 Obligations were only binding for the Annex I countries, all other member states had commitments, but none of 
which they were held accountable to in a legally bidning manner. 
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counterweight to hard law or binding aspects of an agreement—which are also just as valuable a 
tool.  
Most large-scale multilateral agreements or international laws are developed within the 
UN. The organization’s preexisting structure helps facilitate the creation process and easily 
allows for negotiations to be convened. During negotiations, all states have the ability to 
participate in discussion, even if they do not end up signing or ratifying the treaty (Voyiakis 
2010, 106). This occurs often, such as with the US during the Kyoto Protocol. During initial 
negotiations the US, supported by a few other factions, urged for the inclusion of flexibility 
mechanisms which were ultimately included in the final agreement even though the US did not 
ratify it (Betsill and Fiske 2020, 286). The negotiation process does not have a prescribed 
process specified in the VCLT, or any other international law, and therefore, negotiations are 
platforms where states have considerable freedom in airing their concerns and resolving political 
disagreement. Procedures for policymaking are developed during these negotiations and 
establish specific standards for future discussions. The UNFCC set up the institutional 
framework for the Climate Change regime which established the annual Conference of the 
Parties (COP) as the standard form of continual negotiations and assessment. Negotiations are 
one of the longest and most tedious steps of the agreement making process, however, I argue 
they are also the most pivotal step in constructing a successful agreement for all states.  
After initial negotiations, a state’s representative will report back to their governing body, 
and in some cases the public, the results and confirm that it is approved or disapproved by the 
country’s leadership. After an agreement is approved, states then go into a phase of adoption in 
which a forum is conducted to discuss whether the treaty should be revised or renegotiated 
before ratification. At this stage, states also discuss the ratification requirements of the treaty, 
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and at what level of state ratification the treaty will take effect, this is called minimum 
participation. Unless a treaty’s text specifically establishes that reservations are not allowed, a 
state has the ability to voice reservations before ratification. Reservations are defined under 
Article 2 of the VCLT as a “unilateral statement, however phrased or named, made by a State, 
when signing, ratifying, accepting, approving or acceding to a treaty, whereby it purports to 
exclude or to modify the legal effect of certain provisions of the treaty in their application to that 
state.”15 Since they are made unilaterally, reservations do not alter the general meaning and 
obligations of the treaty for other member states. With that being said, all of the agreements 
assessed in this essay have articles within their texts specifically prohibiting reservations; 
Montreal Protocol Art. 18, Kyoto Protocol Art. 26, Paris Agreement Art. 27. One of the main 
reasons for this decision is to maintain the integrity of a treaty, as an agreement can become 
weakened if significant states or a plurality of members make a reservation.  
Implementation and Assessment  
 After a treaty has been ratified and reached enough members to enter into force, it is 
difficult to oversee or enforce compliance if there aren’t compliance details already incorporated 
within an agreement. While there are international bodies established to deal with enforcement, 
such as the ICJ or governing bodies within the UN, they do not have chief authority and are not 
very effective at enforcement. The ICJ has non-compulsory jurisdiction—states have to consent 
 
15 United Nations, Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 23 May 1969, United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 
1155, p. 331, available at: https://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b3a10.html [accessed 8 June 2020] 
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to the Court considering the case. Once a state “accepts the Court’s jurisdiction,” the state must 
comply with the Court’s decision. 
 It is common practice for states to meet periodically to review the agreement and 
adjustments are commonly made to treaties, either amending certain clauses, adding new 
instruments to complement older text, or by updating passages to reflect more modern purposes. 
Generally, these processes require full scale treaty initiation from all members, which would 
require re-entry into force procedures, and again discussion between domestic officials. To 
simplify this process, a number of devices have been developed—such as frameworks or 
umbrella conventions—which establish only general goals and obligation, or the use of easily 
amendable technical annexes. This applies to the climate change regime through its framework-
protocol model established with the UNFCC. As noted, within IEL, and for the agreements 
specifically discussed in this paper, the standard format for these meetings are COPs or MOPs. 
 While routine meetings, some COPs/MOPs reveal important aspects of negotiations, 
important international relations, or results in the addition of a new legal device. This stage of the 
agreement making process is especially pertinent to environmental agreements, as the 
environment is constantly changing, as is our relationship with it, which is why it requires 
constant readjustment to meet goals.  
 Institutional Design Features 
 In order to achieve the two-pronged approach to success as defined in this paper, address 
geopolitical conflict, and avoid free riding at both the extensive and intensive margins, an MEA 
needs an adequate institutional design. I refer to institutional design as the strategic formatting of 
an agreement which encompasses designated procedures and bodies to monitor and deliver on an 
agreement’s goals. These facets of an agreement can range from a more concrete establishment 
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of a timeline, to the less tangible inclusion of adjusting goals when more scientific knowledge 
becomes available, nevertheless they can all be distilled as “precise mechanisms through which 
cooperation can emerge” (Koremenos 2001, 319). I argue that particular attention should be paid 
to institutional design provisions for flexibility and compliance, which I see as equalizers to each 
other to promote ratification and ensure fulfillment of state commitments.   
 As defined above, institutional design features are the central focus of an agreement, 
encompassing all other design features. The two main subsets I am investigating are flexibility 
provisions and compliance provisions. The former can be broken down into four main categories 
of transformative, adaptive, interpretive flexibility, and adaptive flexibility.16 Compliance 
provisions entail any procedures which deal with enforcement of obligations, both in terms of 
dispute settlement and consequences, as well as access to resources to assist states in realizing 
their goals.17 
Legal Provisions Typology  
Flexibility 
Flexibility provisions are generally thought to be useful when there is a level of 
uncertainty about an agreement itself, or issue coverage concerns, as it allows for modifications 
after future knowledge is acquired. Many of the flexibility mechanisms I am going to discuss can 
be incorporated into any type of international agreement, however, I am going to focus 
specifically on the ways they can be built into MEAs, effectively improving MEA outcomes and 
agreement success. As the name suggests, interpretive flexibility provisions give member states 
 
16 Flexibility provisions are distinct, although inclusive of the flexibility mechanisms created in the Kyoto Protocol 
which will be discussed in depth in chapter four. 
17 Unlike flexibility provisions, which I refer to as separate from flexibility mechanisms, I refer to compliance 
provisions and compliance mechanisms interchangeably as there is no terminological overlap in any existing 
agreements. 
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room to interpret an agreement’s rules and obligations. The first direct way this occurs is through 
reservations, however, with the case of the three agreements in this paper, reservations are 
prohibited. Secondly, states have more flexibility to interpret agreements based on how precise 
the rules are. For example, if an agreement does not give a specific benchmark a state must 
reach, states have more margin to decide how best to modify their action to achieve the treaty’s 
overall goal. In contrast to reservations which must be made prior to ratification, ambiguity of 
language gives a lasting source of flexibility to states (Marcoux 2009, 211-212). While 
vagueness of a text may appeal to states hesitant to join an agreement because the lack of 
specificity lowers explicit cost, it also risks reducing the legitimacy of the text. 
Applicational flexibility similarly gives states more freedom when it comes to 
implementation. Implementation, not in terms of what their commitments will be, but rather how 
to implement projects and accomplish their objectives. This is the only category of flexibility not 
established in previous literature and is one I am creating. The main form of applicational 
flexibility is financial funds, such as the Montreal Protocol Multilateral Fund or the Global 
Environmental Facility (GEF). These funds, or other provisions which provide financial or 
technological assistance to states, give states more flexibility and assistance in how they establish 
projects as it lifts barriers from lack of resources.  
Transformative flexibility gives states the power to adjust their original terms of 
cooperation over time. To expand: 
States may provide transformative flexibility both actively and permissively. In the first 
case, states may limit the duration of a multilateral agreement such that renegotiation is 
necessary to sustain cooperation after the initial term expires. Alternately, states may 
provide transformative flexibility in a more permissive sense, by designing provisions 
that allow the terms of cooperation to be amended. In this case, states are faced with the 
further choice of choosing rules to govern the process of adopting amendments. States 
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may set demanding requirements for the adoption of amendments, such as unanimity or 
consensus, or more lenient conditions, such as simple majority support. (Marcoux 2009, 
212-213) 
 
Most agreements require some level of consensus among member states to pass an amendment, 
whether it be a majority, super majority, or unanimous. For the case of Montreal, Kyoto, and 
Paris, voting for amendments typically takes place at the COPs and MOPs respectively.  
Lastly, adaptive flexibility gives states the ability to suspend their commitment based on 
future contingencies instead of adjusting the terms of the agreement. Inclusion of the escape 
mechanism and withdrawal clause are the most direct form of adaptive flexibility (Marcoux 
2009, 211). Both fulfill very similar purposes, however, unilateral withdrawal from a treat is only 
permissible if it is specifically stated in the agreement as defined under Article 54 of the 1969 
VCLT. All agreements analyzed in this paper have articles which include detailed withdrawal 
clauses: Montreal Protocol Article 19, Kyoto Protocol Article 27, and Partis Agreement Article 
28. The United States notably withdrew from the Paris Agreement after the required three-year 
delay from its commencement. Withdrawal clauses are not absolute decisions though, and rather 
allow for states to re-join an agreement, as President Biden initiated on his first day in office. 
Meeting and negotiation structures, such as the Conference of the Parties  (COP) or Meeting of 
the Parties (MOP), can also provide an informal form of adaptive flexibility to adjust state 
commitments.  
 Marcoux (2009) notes that the inclusion of flexibility can be correlated to different 
dynamics in international relations. He asserts that there are lower amounts of flexibility when 
there is a significant power asymmetry among negotiating states (226). However, Marcoux 
categorizes flexibility based on the presence of escape clauses and the degree of consensus 
needed to make adjustments, which I see as only partial measures of flexibility. Moreover, I see 
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escape clauses as an inadequate flexibility device for most MEAs, because as Koremenos (2005) 
points out, “escape clauses do not allow adjustment; rather, they allow states to temporarily 
escape cooperation and return to an unadjusted agreement” (561). For something as complex as 
climate change, this is usually too simple a tool and would further risk key states leaving an 
agreement all together rather than considering revaluating commitments; a reality made possible 
by transformative flexibility provisions.  
Two other provisions I consider forms of flexibility, but which do not neatly apply to one 
of the categories above are minimum participation and soft obligations. I consider minimum 
participation to fit loosely under flexibility provisions because they can be adjusted to allow for 
agreements to take effect at a lower or higher state participation. This room to adjust when an 
agreement enters into force gives the treaty itself, not the states involved, more flexibility in 
enactment. An agreement might aim to have a higher minimum participation rate to encourage 
more states to ratifying the treaty, however, too ambitious minimum participation risks an 
agreement never being ratified and never taking effect. The Doha Amendment to the Kyoto 
protocol, for example, was introduced in 2012, but did not take effect until October 2, 2020, after 
finally meeting the ratification threshold of at least three fourths of the members of the Kyoto 
Protocol. Different states and their clout in the international arena influences their preference for 
the degree of minimum participation. Kesternich (2016) reports that, “small countries with low 
bargaining power in international climate negotiations call for ambitious membership 
requirements” because it might help strengthen their position. Whereas larger developed 
countries tend to “set lower minimum membership requirements but opt for emission thresholds 
that require all major current emitters to participate in a future climate deal” (1058-1059). 
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Secondly, soft obligations, which I see as a subset of soft law, could be considered a form 
of interpretive flexibility, although it does not necessarily mean said commitments are vague. 
Rather, soft obligations imply general commitment to an agreement without precise targets. For 
example, the Paris Agreement, while a binding source of hard law, does not set precise aims for 
states, instead states set their own goals through Nationally Determined Contributions.   
While flexibility provisions are an incredibly powerful tool to achieve higher rates of 
ratification and more meaningful commitment, too much flexibility without precise obligations 
may incentivize non-adherence to targets, making the MEAs objective unattainable and all but 
worthless. Therefore, I argue that flexibility provisions can be balanced with compliance 
provisions to increase the adherence of environmental obligations and therefore the overall 
environmental goals of an agreement through oversight or assistance. 
Compliance 
Although not regulatory in nature, I argue that the climate change regime requires intelligent 
compliance provisions to ensure adherence to obligations. Without a system established to foster 
both collective support and deter from non-compliance, I do not believe there will be enough 
incentive, nor infrastructure, to collectively meet the goals of climate change MEAs. 
Additionally, the inclusion of compliance provisions can assuage concerns of reciprocal 
noncompliance from member states, which otherwise would have a net negative consequence on 
other members (Faure 2020, 58). The first treaty-based non-compliance mechanisms were 
developed within IEL through the Montreal Protocol. These provisions encourage states to not 
only face repercussions for their non-compliance, but also accept that their behavior violated the 
grounds of cooperation. These provisions however are not purely punitive in nature and are 
trending to include facilitative and resolutory measures rather than an adversarial approach. For 
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example, the Paris Agreement’s compliance provisions are specifically designed to be facilitative 
rather than punitive; it has yet to be seen if this approach is effective because the agreement has 
only been in effect for a few years. While I support the notion of compliance provisions leading 
with facilitative methods, I do believe that there needs to be some level of penalty for states 
which break their obligations to both give the agreement credibility and minimize future 
breaches of the agreement. This is one of the reasons scholars suggest the Kyoto Protocol was 
weak; it did not have adequate compliance measures set up for non-Annex 1 countries 
(Martimort and Sand-Zantman 2016; Sandler 2017).  
As defined by the UNEP, compliance mechanisms can entail the following: 
(1) a requirement for information reviewing national performance of MEA obligations 
(“performance review information”); 
(2) institutionalized multilateral procedures to consider apparent instances of non-
compliance (“multilateral non-compliance procedures”); 
(3) multilateral measures adopted to respond to non-compliance (“non-compliance 
response measures”); and 
(4) dispute settlement procedures. 
(UNEP 2009, 9)  
 
I agree with Goeteyn and Maes (2011) that the best compliance mechanisms are those which 
have permanent bodies with standing commitments and support, not just ad hoc bodies. I further 
argue that the bodies’ primary function should not only be punitive, but rather include substantial 
ways to deal with disputes among states and address states’ impediments in attaining their 
targets. By offering solutions to problems, rather than threatening punitive measures due to lack 
of resources, a further level of equality is developed amongst states by the access to resources. 
Furthermore, if assistance is offered, a state may see an additional benefit rather than an inherent 
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cost when obstacles are confronted, which in turn, makes states more likely to comply with their 
commitments, or ratify an agreement in the first place. While “the emergence of these 
mechanisms implicitly highlights the shortcoming of the dispute settlement systems established 
by multilateral environmental agreements,” these mechanisms are “alternatives rather than 
replacements for the traditional means of international law enforcement” (Ong 2010, 320). 
Ultimately compliance is the key for any international law’s success, it is the difference between 
a state following through with commitments and goals never being met—whether this 
compliance is garnered purely based on the legitimacy a law has or specific provisions. 
Conclusion 
Understandably, many are pessimistic about the environment’s future and our ability to 
collectively come together to find a solution. Furthermore, some see inconclusive science as a 
preventative measure against action, however, the precautionary principle posits that lack of full 
scientific knowledge should not cause idleness. In the face of such irrevocable damage as climate 
disaster, states should be proactive rather than reactive (Peel 2020). While the science may not 
be confirmed for precise aspects of anthropogenic climate change, it is overwhelmingly and 
undeniably scientifically supported that the environment is being altered and negatively impacted 
by a number of human actions, mainly the emissions of greenhouse gases. I argue that a 
successful MEA focused on climate change is the crux of the solution, but not the entire fight. A 
comprehensive, equitable, and sustainable agreement must be reflected in, and followed up by, 
domestic policies and individual measures. While a solution does not end with a successful 
MEA, it does start with one, and an agreement with balanced institutional design features can 
maximize the potential for success. 
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Although many argue that aspects of MEAs are not transferable among agreements, 
especially across regimes, some design features of successful agreements shed light on possible 
improvements to MEAs in the climate change regime. It is important, however, to consider the 
context of each environmental issue and tailor it to meet the exact problem at hand (Young 
2011). I argue that while you cannot simply transfer the blueprints of one successful MEA to 
another, especially across regimes, you can incorporate institutional design features which yield 
both increased ratification and adherence. Which is why it is valuable to look at the success of 
various agreements and breakdown what aspects of the agreement—particularly paying attention 
to its mechanism design—engendered success in terms of participation and adherence to 
environmental obligations.  
Chapter 3~ An Assessment of the Montreal Protocol: Key Negotiations, Design Features, 
and Outcome 
Important Dates  
Treaty  Number of Ratifiers18 Year Started  
Vienna Convention for the Protection of the 
Ozone Layer  
198 1985 
Montreal Protocol 198 1987 
London Amendment and Adjustment 198 1990 
Copenhagen Amendment and Adjustment  198 1992 
Vienna Adjustment 198 1995 
Montreal Amendment  198 1997 
Beijing Amendment and Adjustment 198 1999 
Montreal Adjustment 198 2007 
Kigali Amendment 100 2016 
(All ratifications, Country Data, UNEP Ozone Secretariat)19  
 
18 This number includes Palestine and its occupied territories as a member state.  
19 For more visit: https://ozone.unep.org/all-ratifications. 
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Introduction 
It is widely remarked that the ozone regime is one of the most successful international 
environmental regimes. Most often associated with this success is the Montreal Protocol, a 
regulatory treaty which at its foundation included binding commitments from member states to 
reduce their level of production and consumption of ozone depleting substances (ODS). The 
regime was formed as a reaction to new scientific information from the 1970s that found 
stratospheric ozone levels—required for maintaining a livable atmosphere and temperature on 
earth—were being damaged. Although the exact cause of the destruction was not determined 
initially, there was evidence that CFCs were one of the main culprits. The precautionary clause 
and the severity of the issue pushed states to be proactive about a solution. Additionally, the 
collective security threat posed by a weakened ozone encouraged finding a prompt solution.  
 In 1977 the UNEP adopted the World Plan of Action for the Ozone Layer and within the 
next decade individual states, including the US, took steps to ban or limit the consumption of 
ODS, such as CFCs. It was not until 1985 that the ozone regime really began developing in a 
unified international manner through the Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone 
layer (Downie 2020, 107). Like most international environmental regimes, the ozone regime 
used a framework convention model. The Vienna Convention was not regulatory in nature and 
was formally codified through subsequent treaties, such as the Montreal Protocol.  The process 
of establishing the Vienna Convention took nearly five years. Furthermore, the negotiations 
revealed schisms within the international community between what was called the Toronto 
Group and the European Community (Skjœrseth 2012, 41). Negotiations were still swift relative 
to the international environmental legal process and differences resolved.  
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Now, over 35 years since the first framework, there has been more than a 95% global 
reduction in the production and consumption of ODS from baseline levels and, consequentially, 
the ozone has been healing at a steady rate (Skjœrseth 2012, 48).20 The ozone layer over most of 
the earth’s surface should fully recover by 2050 (Downie 2020, 110). The success of the regime 
has been firmly established, so, what more can be gleaned from the agreement that contributed to 
such achievements? First and foremost, one should investigate the institutional design structure 
of the agreement itself, which is the foundation for states to decide how best to accomplish their 
contributions and commitments.  
Overview of Agreement 
The first of Montreal’s 20 articles includes definitions commonly referenced throughout 
the protocol; this increases legitimacy as it clarifies vague language and decreases some level of 
interpretive flexibility as the language has been explicitly defined (Franck 1988, 716). The main 
objective of the agreement can be summed up as follows: reduce the production and 
consumption of ODS, specifically targeting CFCs and some halons.21 In order to achieve this, the 
protocol also details specific provisions. Some of these provisions include establishing a 
multilateral fund to provide financial and technological assistance to states, a detailed 
compliance mechanism, arrangement for annual MOPs in addition to regularly scheduled COPs, 
and a distinction between developing and developed states in their individual commitments  
Prior to the articles of the Montreal protocol, there is a preamble giving collective voice 
to the states involved with the protocol’s creation. The quasi-mission statement both 
 
20 Using 1985 as the base year. 
21 The specific ODSs included under the original Montreal Protocol can be found at the appendix of the agreement 
under “Annex A, Controlled Substances.” Later adjustments and amendments to the protocol added additional 
chemicals under the protocols purview.  
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acknowledges the environmental issue at hand—the depletion of the ozone—whilst also making 
firm commitment to combat the problem through specific practices which are expanded upon in 
the proceeding articles. The most telling paragraph to this introduction is: 
DETERMINED to protect the ozone layer by taking precautionary measures to control 
equitably total global emissions of substances that deplete it, with the ultimate objective of 
their elimination on the basis of developments in scientific knowledge, taking into account 
technical and economic considerations  
 
This declaration is loaded with many references to the provisions to come, as well as some other 
core principles to the ozone regime and International Environmental legal system at large. There 
is reference to the precautionary clause to start, noting that action is better than inaction. There is 
also a foundation of equity and consideration of state’s differing responsibilities and capabilites 
to commit themselves to the solution, in essence, common but differentiated responsibility. This 
is visible through language such as “to control equitably,” rather than equally.  
The article’s substance covers obligations of states, detailed information on how the 
obligations will be assessed and reported, acknowledgement of differing state capabilities, and 
equity measures to provide assistance. The articles also state that compliance measures will be 
created at a later MOP which is further elucidated in Article 11: Meeting of the Parties. At the 
first MOP there is an agenda of five preparations, plans, and procedures that the members must 
work through and agree upon. Article 11 also establishes 10 general functions of the parties so 
that an ongoing meeting structure is prepared. 
The Montreal Protocol is a prime example of a more realistic “managerial approach” for 
international environmental regimes—which at the time was innovative (Faure 2020, 141). A 
managerial approach uses facilitation as a foundational element of its non-compliance measures 
and features strong elements of facilitation and capacity building (Faure 2020; Goeteyn and 
Maes 2011). By building upon the Vienna Convention with specific goals and swift adoption, the 
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Montreal Protocol was able to establish an effective primary rule system. While the Vienna 
Convention established a Convention of the Parties, the Montreal Protocol first brought into 
practice the Meeting of the Parties: a more frequently convening meeting of the member states to 
overview treaty objective attainment, state methods to do so, and resolve other political matters. 
MOPs allow for the reevaluation of the protocol and the incorporation of additional design 
provisions such as those to strengthen compliance, or the strengthening of chemicals to be 
phased out under the protocol. One of the most valuable abilities the MOP offers is the platform 
for adding adjustment provisions. These provisions create a great deal of flexibility in adjusting 
the agreement because, unlike an amendment, adjustments do not need a formal vote or 
unanimous support, and are automatically applicable to all member states that ratified the 
original protocol (Article 2, Section 9 of the Montreal Protocol). This feature enables parties to 
respond to new scientific information, accelerate chemical coverage or reduction goals, and 
strength existing controls on ODS—which all become binding immediately. As specified within 
the agreement, the MOP is one of two annual meeting groups in addition to the Open-ended 
Working Group (Montreal Protocol). Both the MOP and Open-ended Working Group are 
assisted by the Ozone Secretariat which oversees many of the functions of the protocol, which all 
member states must report to (Downie 2020, 107). 
Members, Commitments, and Negotiating Blocs 
 Article 16 of the Montreal Protocol details that entry into force is contingent on not the 
number of ratifying states themselves, but the total percent of ODS production said states 
represent.22 As such, at the time the treaty entered into force, as clarified by Article 16 of the 
 
22 The article reads, “This Protocol shall enter into force on 1 January 1989, provided that at least eleven instruments 
of ratification, acceptance, approval of the Protocol or accession thereto have been deposited by States or regional 
economic integration organizations representing at least two-thirds of 1986 estimated global consumption of the 
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protocol, 47 states had ratified the agreement. By including a minimum participation threshold, 
dependent on emissions, the agreement was able to limit the leakage problem associated with 
non-signatory countries and minimize free-riding at the extensive margins (Sandler 2016, 348). 
By having a threshold of 2/3rds of the CFC consumption, a noticeable dent was triggered by 
requiring commitment from all major consumers. Currently the agreement has been ratified by 
198 recognized members and is the first international environmental agreement to achieve 
universal ratification, a huge feat.  
The initial membership in 1989 includes the two main negotiating blocs mentioned in the 
introduction, the Toronto Group—headed by the US and including Canada, and the Nordic 
countries (Finland, Norway, Sweden) and Switzerland—and the European Community (EC). 
The Toronto group was much more ambitious in its phaseout dates of ODSs, specifically CFCs, 
while the European Community was more hesitant to add strict binding obligations (Chasek and 
Downie 2017, 112-113). This rift emerged during earlier ozone negotiations and reflected the 
market situation in which the US consumed most CFCs, while the EC exported most of the 
CFCs, giving the EC a greater economic trade-off cost in the matter (Sandler 2016, 349; 
Skjœrseth 2012, 41; DeSombre 2001, 56-58). One of the loudest voices for the EC was London, 
but this division was almost completely healed during the 2nd MOP in London in which Britain 
supported the US’s stance to halt CFC production by 2020 (Chasek and Downie 2917, Downie 
2020; Sandler 2016). 
 As of 1990 there were only about 60 member states to the Montreal Protocol, and the 
negotiations exposed the dominance of the US and Europe in decision making. While the north 
 
controlled substances, and the provisions of paragraph 1 of Article 17 of the Convention have been fulfilled. In the 
event that these conditions have not been fulfilled by that date, the Protocol shall enter into force on the ninetieth 
day following the date on which the conditions have been fulfilled.” 
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dominated early negotiations, there was also a large number of developing countries which had 
already signed on at this point, despite their nominal levels of production and consumption of 
ODSs. One of the reasons for some of the developing countries, such as those in Africa, joining 
so early on is the leeway and flexibility they were given with their reduction obligations, as well 
as the fact that most CFCs and ODS were produced in developed countries and more widely 
consumed in those places such as the EC (Chasek and Downie 2017). This already low level of 
CFC usage and production created less of a burden for developing countries to join, since their 
adjustment costs were so much lower.  
The Protocol also included elements to address state differences and integrated CBDR 
through the annex structure. Developed countries were required to begin phasing out the five 
CFCs and three halons defined under Annex A at the end of the protocol. Furthermore, these 
developed states were expected to achieve a 50% reduction in CFC consumption by 1998—
relative to the baseline year of 1986. For halons, states were to freeze their consumption at 1986 
levels by 1993—this was to be achieved within 37 months of the treaty entering into force. For 
developing countries these same central obligations remained, but with a 10-year grace period 
given (Montreal Protocol, Article 5). Even with the grace period, non-annex states were still held 
to standard and were expected to “not exceed an annual calculated level of consumption of 0.3 
kilograms per capita” (Montreal Protocol, Article 5). This grace period reinforced the CBDR by 
holding developing states to expectations, while still acknowledging their varied situation, 
effectively maintaining equity amongst member states and as a core tenant of the regime. 
It should be noted that exemptions also “exist for some countries to continue the 
production and consumption of small amounts of some ODS for ‘essential uses’ after the 
phaseout dates” …and a larger “and more controversial exemptions exist for ‘critical’ 
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agricultural and ‘quarantine and pre-shipment’ uses of methyl bromide” (Downie 2020, 107). 
This further differentiation not only made states more likely to commit to cutbacks because of 
the flexibility given to specific situations, but also increased the perceived level of fairness the 
treaty had amongst different states.   
Institutional Design Features and Related Negotiations  
Over the course of a few decades since Montreal’s entry into force, the MOP facilitated  
numerous adjustments, amendments, and restructuring, in doing so, proving to be an invaluable 
tool. These meetings resulted in most of the institutional design features above, and more 
valuably illuminates the international relations which characterized the ozone regime at the time. 
The various design features of the protocol were innovative and effective, namely in the ways 
they expanded the treaty’s breadth and depth of coverage. These key architectural elements have 
influenced proceeding treaties, with compliance panels, reporting requirements, assessment 
panels, and review procedures mirrored in other agreements’ structures (Downie and Chasek 
2017, 114). The treaty’s design features expand beyond the simple buckets of flexibility and 
compliance mentioned in the previous chapters and are a product of negotiations and state 
relations shifting over time. Being the landmark environmental agreement it was, in many ways 
it blazed the trail for future MEAs to expand on these institutional design features and use the 
meeting framework as a way to structure ongoing negotiations. The compliance mechanisms in 
the Montreal Protocol in particular became a model for future agreements, while the flexibility 
provisions are more fluid. This section will discuss some of the most notable design features of 
the agreement and the consequential negotiations, many of which lead to the design features’ 
establishments. Discussion will begin with negotiations leading up to the Vienna Convention, 
continuing on to an analysis of the agreements’ components of flexibility and compliance. 
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The leading blocs at the start of the ozone regime negotiations were the Toronto group 
and the European Community. While the two fundamentally wanted to see an end to ozone 
depletion, they had a discrepancy about the degree of chemical reductions as well as the timeline. 
Since both blocs were of fairly symmetric power—meaning both blocs had equal influence in 
terms of their wealth, stature, and contributions to the issue—and the ozone required a solution, 
negotiation and compromise were expected. During the final stages of negotiations for the 
Vienna Convention, the Toronto group abandoned the idea of binding controls on CFCs when 
they thought that the European Community and Japan would not join. This dynamic shows the 
pitfall of the LCD problem. Since the European Community is a major contributor to ODS 
production they are a crux to the solution, and therefore restrictions are loosened low enough to 
appeal to the EC, in doing so diluting some of the strength of originally proposed obligations. 
While the US and other members of the Toronto group had banned CFCs relatively early and had 
the ability to influence and possibly encourage asymmetric groups to do the same, the match 
between Europe and the Toronto was too equal to allow for Toronto to have any leverage over 
Europe’s decision (Downie 2020, 115; Sandler 2016, 351).23 Although originally over 40% of 
CFCs were produced in the US, over 40% were also produced in Europe. While the US had 
already instated strict cutbacks, securing the EC’s participation was still necessary for a solution 
to be reached. Another possible veto coalition formed around large developing countries, such as 
the BRICS. Although they were not producing many ODS at the time of the ozone regime’s 
formation, they had leverage from the fact that they could produce a lot more in the future 
(Chasek and Downie 2017, 111). Europe also presented a similar position with their production 
 
23 By asymmetric, I mean an uneven match between two powers. In which one state or group has much more power, 
whether in terms of wealth, resources, or social capital relative to another. This assumes that the more powerful state 
of the two has more bargaining power against the other and in negotiations. For more in relations to MEAs, see 
Marcoux (2009) or Koremenos (2005). 
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cap not yet realized, but to a lesser degree than the cumulative power of the Global South and 
BRICS.  
After the Vienna Convention, the prominence of these two groups during negotiations 
faded and the members of the European Community eventually agreed to binding reductions for 
CFCs and other ODS. Much like the Vienna Convention, the Montreal Protocol was also a 
legacy of these initial negotiations and its design structure was influenced by these negotiating 
blocs. Many of the consequential provisions for flexibility and compliance resulted from 
opinions from these blocs.  
I will first begin by analyzing some of the most significant flexibility provisions within 
the agreement and any negotiations which were consequential to the provisions’ formations. 
Arguably, the most valuable element of flexibility in the protocol is what I consider to be the 
transformative flexibility achieved through annual MOPs and their successive adjustment 
provisions. These tools are transformative instruments because they allow commitments to be 
ratcheted up, “both by accelerating phaseout schedules for those chemical already covered and 
by adding more chemicals to the list of those covered under the terms of the agreement” (Young 
2016, 125). The Meeting of the Parties fulfills virtually the same function as the Conference of 
the Parties but is given the name to differentiate the Protocol from the COP of the Vienna 
Convention (Montreal Protocol, Article 11). This is one of the simplest mechanisms to increase 
the transformative flexibility of an agreement while also maintaining some interpretive flexibility 
in the original text. This method of flexibility also takes into account the resources and 
capabilities of states and technology to confront the issue at hand; just because a shift might not 
be economically feasible in the original iteration of an agreement, does not mean it should not be 
integrated into states obligations once it does become so (Young 2016, 126). 
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The most outright example of flexibility in the protocol is the adaptive flexibility of the 
Withdrawal Clause of Article 19. While the treaty does not offer an opportunity to make 
unilateral reservations, this article does allow states to exit the agreement and relinquish any 
obligations. However, this cannot be done immediately after entering into force, but rather “any 
time after four years of assuming the obligations specified in paragraphs 1 to 4 of Article 2” 
(Montreal Protocol, Article 19). The contingency of upholding certain parts of Art. 2 ensures that 
if a state ratifies the agreement, they are still held to some standard of adherence.  To expand, 
Art. 2 covers Control Measures, and as such, even states which later withdraw from the Protocol 
are still expected to comply with their obligations of chemical reductions for the time being.  
Another main aspect of the institutional design of the Montreal protocol is the Montreal 
Protocol Multilateral Fund. First and foremost, this is categorized under flexibility provisions 
generally. More specifically, I label this as applicational flexibility as it assists states with 
applying projects and achieving their individual commitments. The fund gives states flexibility 
in the way they achieve their commitment and simultaneously increases the chance of 
compliance. Compliance is increased as the perceived direct cost of the obligation is lowered, 
and states, therefore, feel more confident in their ability to meet their goals (Young 2016, 127). 
While some investment costs of a treaty are assumed by individual states before entering into a 
treaty—such as time and resources of initial negotiation and contribution to reserves such as the 
fund—the fund allows for a greater return as it offers insurance that other states will be able to 
achieve their end of the bargain (Boockmann and Thurner 2006, 125).  In other words, this 
institutional design feature also has the effect of promoting collective action by offering 
incentives “to make potential participants view action as yielding positive net benefits,” rather 
than a net loss from the cost of readjusting industries to meet the new restrictions on 
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consumption (Sandler 2016, 348). In tandem with the 10-year delayed start given to developing 
states, these measures help mollify developing countries’ concerns toward their inability to 
achieve such ambitious obligations, and rather “meets the incremental cost to developing 
countries of implementing the control measures” (Chasek and Downie 2017, 116). The fund not 
only gives states flexibility (i) in how they achieve their commitments, but also (ii) reduces non-
compliance, as the problem of incapacity due to lack of resources and technological abilities is 
given an acceptable solution (Faure 2020, 138). 
The details of the fund, in addition to some other important design features of the 
agreement, were refined and expanded upon at the 2nd MOP in London in 1990. The largest 
developments, generally, since Montreal’s establishment were made during the London meeting 
as the parties discussed the non-compliance measures, decided upon the exact phaseout dates of 
the chemicals, and designed the Multilateral Fund; all of which were imperative for the treaty’s 
success. The MOP’s report notes include remarks on general negotiating groups but do not cite 
specific states when recording comments. The meeting resulted in clarified dates for the phaseout 
of ODSs, requiring that parties completely phase out the production and consumption of the 
original CFCs, halons, and carbon tetrachloride listed under Annex A of the protocol by the year 
2000 and by the year 2005 for methyl chloroform. It is recorded that many developed countries 
were in favor of accelerated phaseout and even suggested expediting the cutoff date to 1997 for 
CFCs and imposing further limitations for halons (Report of the 2nd Meeting of the Parties to the 
Montreal Protocol). There was visible conflict between the north and south during debate, as 
developing countries pointed out that by having the CFC reductions as they currently stood, 
many potential investors had to be turned away. Another inequality was pointed out by 
developing states, in that, “developing countries were being asked to reduce production and 
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consumption to a level 70 per cent below that of developed countries” (Report of the 2nd 
Meeting of the Parties to the Montreal Protocol, 6). Partially in response to these specific 
concerns, and partially due to the belief that strengthening the protocol must also be consistent 
with equal global development, discussions pivoted to the Multilateral Fund.  
 The fund was monumental in addressing the demands of developing countries such as 
China and India. Although both countries—in particular China—can be thought of today as 
growing world powers, at the time of the MOP in London they were only beginning to develop 
more rapidly. Both countries were comfortable members of the global south, and the 
establishment of the fund was proof of not only the south’s collective power, but also the 
recognition and commitment from the north of CBDR and the need for a collective equitable 
solution (Chasek and Downie 2017, 116). The north acknowledged that much of the problem fell 
at their feet and, therefore, they were to bear more of the burden in terms of cleanup. The notes 
from the London MOP under the general debate subsection, number 27 records: 
A number of representatives of developed countries referred to their country's 
responsibilities on the "polluter pays" principle. Some stated that their country's 
contribution to the Multilateral Fund would not in any way affect their other development 
assistance programmes. With regard to fixing contributions to the Multilateral Fund, a 
number of delegations proposed the use of the United Nations scale of assessments while 
others proposed a scale based on 1986 consumption of controlled substances. On the 
matter of "equitable sharing", several representatives mentioned the need for financing 
without conditionality while one suggested that guidelines were required in order to 
ensure that country studies, which were used for assessing incremental financing and for 
identifying the needs of developing countries, were made on a comparable basis, with the 
assistance of consultants (Report of the 2nd Meeting of the Parties to the Montreal 
Protocol, 7). 
While developing countries seemed to be receptive to these comments from developed countries, 
they also expressed suspicion towards the north’s following through with such commitments. 
Under “Decision II/8 Financial Mechanism,” the fund and its details were confirmed (Report of 
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the 2nd Meeting of the Parties to the Montreal Protocol, 10-12). The fund is replenished every 
three years and is under the oversight of an Executive committee, creating further vertical 
regulations and aspiring for greater equity among member states. 24 
  The Protocol was not just proficient because of its effective incorporation of flexibility 
provisions, but rather because of the balance it struck between the flexibility and compliance 
measures. The Protocol incites compliance by offering assistance through the fund and by 
constructing a non-compliance structure which is facilitative rather than adversarial. Compliance 
and non-compliance are two edges of the same sword, both elements function to keep states on 
track to follow through with their commitments and agreements in the protocol. A non-
compliance structure was introduced under Article 8 of the agreement and a comprehensive 
version established at the first MOP (Montreal Protocol, Article 8: Non-compliance, 1). These 
compliance measures were adopted at the 4th MOP in Copenhagen in 1992 under Annex IV and 
V; this was the next noteworthy MOP since London. The non-compliance procedures encourage 
states to reach out themselves if they are having difficulty achieving their commitments. 
Furthermore, the measures taken if non-compliance is continued rest on assistance rather than 
punitive measures—suspension is the last resort.  
 Another important result of this MOP was the establishment of the Implementation 
Committee for non-compliance. One of the most useful design features of the non-compliance 
mechanisms were the creation of the “essential use exemptions.” Some negotiating blocs resisted 
including an exemption—such as third party non-governmental actors—insisting that it 
weakened the overall aim of the protocol to halt the depletion of ozone. However, without the 
exemptions, commitments would have been even lower because states would have been 
 
24 The fund’s design is further elucidated on pages 27 to 28 of the report, under Article 10: Financial Mechanisms.  
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unwilling to agree at all and no consensus reached. If compromise was not reached, the integrity 
of the treaty would have been weakened to an even greater extent (Report of the Fourth Meeting 
of the Parties to the Montreal Protocol, 11). In other words, “while providing a loophole, the 
inclusion of exemptions was a way to overcome the lowest-common-denominator problem” and 
avoid states from vetoing faster phaseout dates (Chasek and Downie 2017, 118). In some ways, 
this flexibility is akin to the interpretive flexibility offered by reservations to an original protocol. 
However, since the Montreal protocol does not allow for reservations, and the essential use 
exemption is much more specific, there is a greater balance between offering flexibility and still 
maintaining the goal of the agreement.  
The Implementation Committee consists of ten representatives elected by the Members of 
the party and takes into account equitable geographic location. The group accepts submissions 
from states against other members, as well as for the state reporting about themselves, and are 
responsible for not only reviewing the submissions and their general quality, but also the 
reliability of the data reported by the member states (Faure 2020, 146). By reconceiving of 
traditional noncompliance standards, states have more incentive to self-report; such admissions 
do not automatically lead to sanctions or punishment, but rather remedies and support. In other 
words, “in this managerial approach, reporting noncompliance should not be threatening, in fact, 
it may well be in the state’s interest” (Faure 2020, 146). 
 Another significant result of MOP-4 was another strengthening in control measures: 
methyl bromide was added to the list of restricted chemicals and a discussion of including 
HCFCs took place. The way discussions were presented allowed for opening remarks from the 
scientific assessment panel before state representatives voiced their concerns. While the 
economic and technological situation of tighter restrictions seemed viable for developed 
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countries, developing countries were concerned that they would not have affordable access to 
such chemicals during the ten-year delayed grace period of phase-out that they were granted. A 
primary concern between the north and south throughout such debates centered around the 
economic implications and the greater fragility the south had when it came to reductions (Report 
of the Fourth Meeting of the Parties to the Montreal Protocol, 10). The phaseout of any chemical, 
or transition to alternative chemicals—which may be more expensive—creates more instability 
for the south as they have less financial resources to begin with, couples with less advanced 
industry practices. As for HCFCs, the 1990 London Amendment resulted in a non-binding 
agreement that HCFCs would not require a phase-out until the year 2040. Compared to the early 
negotiations of the Ozone regime in the 70s and 80s, by the mid 2000s, the EC and US had 
largely reversed their roles. The US no longer took the lead in pushing for tighter restriction, but 
rather the EC began advocating for accelerated phaseout dates—particularly in HCFCs. While 
the south maintained their concerns that such additional restrictions would hamper their 
economy, the US and Australia now joined forces in an opposing veto coalition (Chasek and 
Downie 2017, 118). The newly formed veto coalition of China, India, Australia, and the US 
argued that “further restrictions on HCFCs would not reduce damage to the ozone layer enough 
to justify the extra economic costs” of agreements to accelerate ODS phaseout schedules, and 
this stalemate continued until 2007 (Chasek and Downie 2017, 118). This timeline was later 
reduced to the year 2030 during the 1992 Copenhagen MOP, which demonstrates the Protocol’s 
ability to strike a balance between high commitment, realistic demands of industry, and state’s 
concern; both minimizing the adjustment cost and achieving the overall objective of reduction 
(Gareau 2010, 219).  
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 The last MOP I am going to discuss is MOP-19, which took place in Montreal in 2007 
and resulted in an adjustment provision. This meeting marked the twentieth-year anniversary 
since the Montreal protocol entered into force and was one of the last MOPs to result in any 
significant increasing of restrictions. In a surprising turn of events, this MOP marked the end of 
the HCFC stalemate and accelerated the phaseout by a full decade (Chasek and Downie 2017, 
121). What is noteworthy about this advance is that HCFCs are not only ODS but also GHG, and 
the cutbacks showed a shift in attitudes of states. The connection between the ozone and climate 
change regime is evident in the repeated reference to the overlap in the MOP notes, and specific 
role HCFCs played in terms of the Kyoto Clean Development Mechanisms (Report of the 
Nineteenth Meeting of the Parties to the Montreal Protocol, 16-17).25  The US resumed its role as 
a lead negotiator and proponent of tighter restrictions, both because the situation had become 
more affordable with technological advancements, and also to present itself positively to the 
international community as an earlier leader in climate change (Chasek and Downie 2017, 119).  
The ability to repeatedly redefine and specify the agreement through the MOPs further 
increases the legitimacy of the treaty. Furthermore, the primary rule system of the Montreal 
Protocol was built up by amendments that provided more substance—which could be thought of 
as secondary rule systems—that induced even more compliance (Faure 2020, 138; Franck 1988, 
729).26 Moreover, the oversight of compliance was simplified by monitoring a few producers 
rather than thousands of consumers, which made the entire process more practical to successfully 
execute (Faure 2020, 144). As noted, the Protocol aimed to oversee production, not consumption, 
 
25 The Kyoto Clean Development Mechanisms will be discussed more in depth in the next chapter, but is one of the 
flexible mechanisms, supposedly based on the Montreal Protocol and the Multilateral Fund, yet not as successful in 
implementation.  
26 By primary rule system I am referring to the original and prime authority the protocol has through its binding 
obligations. Any amendments create vertical reinforcement as a secondary set of rules which build upon and 
reinforce the values in the protocol, therefore reinforces its legitimacy. 
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of ODS. Because only a dozen or so states, and within those stats only a handful of companies, 
produced ODS, it was much easier to keep track of then the array of consumers. 
 There are a number of other factors which have little or nothing to do with the design 
structure of the treaty itself, but which contributed to its success. Most vitally for the ozone 
regime, many of the chemicals responsible for ozone damage were produced by a small number 
of corporate interests and most had easily replaceable substances; this led to a relatively small 
shift in behavioral change and therefore a lower cost overall, which aided in the overall level of 
compliance (Faure 2020, 137).  The situation has an easily accessible and affordable direct 
substitute, this lowered the adjustment cost as less work needed to be put into research or directly 
into covering the transition. Therefore, the overall feasibility of achieving the goal was increased 
and consistently the likelihood of non-compliance decreased because of the reduced difficulty. 
The balance present between industry and societal demand for the services previously provided 
by ODS was achieved through the “protracted transition to ozone-free production,” rather than 
an immediate ban. The balancing of demands can be attributed to the design of the treaty and not 
the chemical at hand (Gareau 2020, 219). Secondly, the collective action of states combining 
their efforts was behind the success of the Montreal protocol and the fact that influential states 
took the lead on banning CFCs prior to the agreement’s constructions, was immeasurably helpful 
in mobilizing support (Sandler 2016, 348) 
Conclusion  
The progression of increasingly tightened restrictions facilitated by the MOP supports 
Young’s theory that IEAs should begin in a modest fashion and gradually be made stricter to 
achieve an agreement’s aim (2011). The resulting institutional design offered selective incentives 
and punishments in the form of the Multilateral Fund and non-compliance mechanisms 
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respectively; these jointly increased the number of states who viewed participation as a net 
benefit (Sandler 2016, 361). While negotiations demonstrated a schism between the north and 
south, and initially between the Toronto group and European community, the MOPs proved to be 
an effective platform for resolving differences. The institutional design balanced flexibility and 
assistance. This, in turn, appeased concerns from developing states, and EC, on the economic 
impact of reductions, while the non-compliance mechanisms facilitated non-adversarial 
resolutions to challenges. From the first MOP in the 1990s to MOP-19 in Montreal in 2007, the 
growing power of the south is evident in their stance during negotiations. By MOP-19, for 
example, China and India had become fierce opponents of phasing out HCFCs and had much 
more influence during negotiations because of their growing stature. In exchange for a political 
commitment to assist China and India financially, in other words ensure their continued growth 
in spite of restrictions, a détente was reached in 2007 and the south agreed to binding restrictions 
on HCFCs.  
Not only did the Montreal Protocol herald the first universal participation of any 
international environmental regime, but it also confronted the growing calls for CBDR. Nothing 
was more instrumental to this success than the MOPs and their ability to craft a well-functioning 
institutional design and a managerial approach to international environmental solutions. The 
ozone is on track to fully recover by 2050 and has already demonstrated incredible progress with 
worldwide ODS consumption falling by more than 97% (Skjœrseth 2012, 41); there has to be 
another regime more successful both in terms of process and outcome.   
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Chapter 4~ An Assessment of the Kyoto Protocol: Key Negotiations, Design Features, and 
Outcome 
Important Dates 
Treaty  Year Started  
Rio Conference  1992 
United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change enters into force 
1994 
COP-1 Berlin 1994 
Kyoto Protocol Adopted 1997 
Marrakesh Accords 2001 
Kyoto Protocol Enters into Force 2005 
Bali Roadmap  2007 
Copenhagen Accord 2009 
Cancun Agreement 2010 
Doha Agreement 2012 
Paris Agreement 2016 
Introduction 
 Even more so than the ozone problem, climate change has proven to be relentless in its 
reach, indiscriminately effecting every corner of the planet and every country—no matter how 
much they have or have not directly contributed to the problem. It is a global commons issue at 
its core, the consequences of inaction leave no state un-scathed (Sandler 2017, 352). Most 
pessimistically, while climate change is the most existential threat humanity has ever faced, 
unlike the ozone regime, it has not born any successful solutions. Much like the ozone regime, 
the climate change regime is a framework convention model, beginning with the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCC) in 1994 which created the basic 
architecture to address climate change and showcased global environmental efforts. Against the 
wishes of the veto coalition lead by the US, a few years later the Kyoto Protocol was adopted 
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and then entered into force, setting specific binding obligations guided by the principles laid out 
in the UNFCC (Betsill and Fiske 2020, 276; Chasek and Downie 2017, 166). 
 While both Kyoto and Montreal required behavioral change from states, comparatively 
far fewer players were culpable for the majority of the ozone problem—resulting in a lower 
overall behavioral change and at a lower cost to states and individual actors. On the other hand, 
climate change does not have one, or even a few chemicals and industries that can be held 
responsible for the issues at hand. The While category of chemicals responsible for climate 
change, GHG, is a comparable grouping to the list of chemicals to blame for the ozone problem 
to ODS. However, any comparisons end there, as the number of chemicals which fall under 
GHGs far exceed the list of ODSs—even ozone at the tropospheric level is considered a GHG). 
With more players contributing to the problem and more chemicals to reduce, this requires more 
players committed to adjusting their behavior to find a solution. This would be a tall order for 
most international regimes, but with one as connected to the global economy as the fossil fuel 
energy sector and related industry, the task is even more daunting. 
 Although scientific evidence of anthropogenic climate alteration dates back as far as the 
late 1800s, political conversation on the topic did not gain international prominence until the 70s 
and 80s (Chasek and Downie 2017, 163). Consequentially, the policy formulation of the climate 
change regime formally began with the UNFCC in 1992 (Andresen and Boasson 2012, 49; 
Chasek and Downie 2017, 162-163). In the three decades since negotiations began, there have 
been dozens of multilateral environmental agreements building upon the convention and 
hundreds more unilateral commitments made by individual states.  
 Lee 62 
 This chapter will proceed by briefly connecting the UNFCC to the Kyoto Protocol and 
then unpack the objective and key components of the Kyoto Protocol, including its members and 
their commitments. It will then proceed to concentrate in depth on the protocol’s institutional 
design features, with a particular focus on flexibility and compliance. The Marrakesh Accords 
will be discussed in this section, although they were conducted in the interim between Kyoto’s 
adoption and entering into force. The design structure will be discussed in relation to the 
significant negotiations which helped construct them. 
UNFCC to Kyoto 
The framework convention’s articles collectively outline a clear structure for future 
agreements, such as the Kyoto Protocol, to build upon. Included in the Convention’s articles are 
establishment for some of the institutional design mechanisms central to the Kyoto Protocol, 
such as financial mechanisms for assistance and technological transfer, as well as dispute 
settlements, and subsidiary bodies. The second article, titled “Objective,” speaks to the huge task 
at hand and the wide-reaching ramifications of climate change. Unlike ozone, climate change 
does not affect one feature of the natural system so neatly, but nevertheless a culprit emerges in 
the form of GHGs. As such, the main objective of the convention is the “stabilization of 
greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous 
anthropogenic interference with the climate system.” As is true of the framework convention 
system, future protocols or “legal instruments that the conference of the Parties may adopt,” are 
to build upon this objective. This is reinforced by the brief preamble to the Kyoto Protocol which 
reiterates that the members of the Kyoto Protocol are first and foremost members of the UNFCC 
and their commitment to the Protocol follow in line with that of the Convention. These elements 
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all add further levels of legitimacy with concise and specific language through the definitions 
and a reiteration of principles and obligations; in other words, adding some elements of a 
secondary rule system (Franck 1988, 716 and 729). Under article three, “principles,” many of the 
same core tenants established in the ozone regime are echoed: common but differentiated 
responsibility, the precautionary principle, polluter pays, and collective action.27  
 One of the most significant COPs of the climate change regime characterizes America’s 
adversarial stance, COP-1 in Berlin. While the US under President Clinton’s leadership initially 
agreed to set emission limits for a set period, as detailed in a later protocol, the US Senate 
forcefully pushed back. They passed a unanimous resolution in 1997 calling for Clinton to not 
agree to any reductions, seeing the decision as ultimately unfair and injurious to the US and its 
industries; most critically on the grounds that the protocol would essentially make developing 
countries exempt from any real restrictions (Sunstein 2007, 25). The political tides turned into 
even more clear disfavor of Kyoto under the Bush administration, in which the president called it 
“fatally flawed,” pointing to the lack of participation from developing countries as a real deal 
breaker. While addressing the fact that the protocol’s commitments “exempts 80% of the world,” 
Bush specifically calls out China and India, directly inciting the tension between the US and the 
rising powers of the East (Sunstein 2007, 28; Betsill and Fiske 2020, 283). This can be thought 
of in terms of the developing countries being free riders to the protocol and its associated reward, 
while other developed countries would be at a comparatively much higher cost with their binding 
commitments, a jeopardy the US was not willing to take.  
 
27 In the ozone regime this preamble and related definitions, which give more legitimacy to the agreement through a 
secondary rule system and precise language/definitions, is present in the Montreal protocol itself, not the framework 
convention as it is in Kyoto. This decision could be evidence that the international community realized the 
importance of including and establishing this foundation at the beginning of the policy formation process.  
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 The Kyoto Protocol negotiations began in the 1990s, and the agreement was adopted in 
1997. However, the treaty did not become effective until 2005 when it reached the minimum 
participation for entry into force—no less than 55 parties to the UNFCC which include parties 
under Annex I and account for a total of at least 55% of all CO2 emissions (Kyoto Protocol, 
Article 25; Sunstein 2007, 4). Just over a decade after the UNFCC was first created in Rio, the 
protocol looks like the beginning of meaningful climate action with the first binding agreements 
for top emitting states.  
Overview of the Kyoto Protocol  
 While there are many important elements to the climate change regime, this chapter 
focuses on the most consequential agreement, the Kyoto Protocol.28 It is more detailed compared 
to the Climate Convention and more substantive in its institutional design mechanisms, and 
importantly deviates from the soft law and non-legally binding emission reductions on developed 
nations. The structure of the agreement can be divided roughly into the following categories “1) 
emission commitment levels; 2) methodologies for estimating emissions; 3) commitments 
regarding emission reductions and climate change adaptation; 4) procedures for ensuring 
compliance with commitments and addressing non-compliance; and 5) transfer of resources from 
developed to developing countries” (Andresen and Boasson 2012, 52). These sections follow in 
suit with many of the elements found in the Montreal Protocol: first standards for emission 
reductions, non-compliance measures, and addressing of developed versus developing countries. 
 
28 I consider Kyoto to be most consequential because it was the first international effort to set specific emission 
reductions binding upon states in aims of mitigating the impact of global warming. While Paris and subsequent 
agreements set other specific binding targets its notoriety comes from it being the first to do so, setting certain 
standards along the way.  
 Lee 65 
Yet, while modeled on the Montreal Protocol it will be unpacked how the two could have 
resulted in such different outcomes.  
Members and Commitments 
 The member states and their commitments are where the greatest initial divergence 
occurs between the ozone regime and the climate change regime. While the Montreal Protocol 
acknowledged the CBDR of developed versus developing states with its allotment of a 10-year 
grace period for developing countries, the Kyoto Protocol took it one step further. Kyoto created 
an Annex system for member states, under which only Annex I states were given specific 
binding commitments and required to submit an annual review. Non-annex states to the 
agreement were held to the same obligations detailed in the UNFCC and Kyoto Protocol, but 
they had no binding obligations to specific targets, and less frequent reporting to the secretariat.  
Under the Annex system, there was an upper limit for either individual or aggregate 
emissions of GHG capped at 5% below 1990 levels by 2012 (Kyoto Protocol, Article 3). 
Additionally, under Annex B of the protocol there is a list of states with their emission 
reductions commitments.29 As Annex B lists, certain countries were allowed to increase their 
emissions, including Norway, Australia, and Iceland. 
There is a further division amongst non-annex countries differentiating between small 
developing island nations, oil producing developing states, and the least developing states 
(Melkas 2007, 270). These states all have special consideration under the Kyoto Protocol and 
UNFCC because of their particular vulnerabilities—whether economic or geographic—which 
 
29 It should also be noted that originally the US was under the Annex B countries even though they never formally 
ratified the treaty, and therefore, were not subject to any binding commitments. 
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position them to be more liable to suffer from either the consequences of climate change itself or 
the economic transition caused by lowering emissions (Von Stein 2020, 246-248). Simply by 
acknowledging the unique positions each state was in further developed the notion of CBDR. 
The differentiation gave even more flexibility than a simple Annex and non-annex country list, 
giving more insight into how each state plans and needs to address climate change. Also included 
in the Annex was the list of GHGs included in the emission reductions coverage: carbon 
monoxide, methane, nitrous oxide, sulphur hexafluoride, hydrofluorocarbons, perfluorocarbons 
(Kyoto Protocol Annex A). 
As of 2018, 192 of the 197 states party to the UNFCC have ratified the Kyoto Protocol. 
The five states recognized by the UN which have ratified the UNFCC and not the Kyoto Protocol 
are: Andorra, Canada, US, South Sudan, and the State of Palestine. Most notable on this list are 
the US and Canada, which collectively accounted for 16% of global GHG emissions in 2017—
the US emitting 14% of the 16% (Chasek and Downie 2017; Ritchie and Roser 2020). While the 
US never formally ratified the Protocol, Canada initially did, later withdrawing officially in 2012 
(Savaşan 2017, 186). Without these two key players—crucial because of their large contribution 
to aggregate global emissions and their influence globally and regionally—it is difficult to 
envision global emissions reducing to the level needed to limit warming by 2% (as decided by 
the Cancun agreement).  
International Relations 
 During climate change negotiations, a natural division emerged early on between states 
with few native GHG producing industries—and consequentially were dependent on imported 
energy—and states that high levels of domestic production of cheap fossil-fuel produced energy. 
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The former included Japan and most states in the EC. The latter included Brazil, China, India, 
Mexico, Canada, and the United States (Chasek and Downie 2017, 166). There was also a 
smaller coalition of states whose economy was highly dependent on fossil fuel export: The Arab 
oil states, Australia, Norway, and initially the UK (Chasek and Downie 2017, 166). During the 
initial negotiations of the ozone regime the EC was hesitant to make specific commitments while 
the US and Canada pushed for earlier and more aggressive commitments. The climate change 
negotiations mirror a reversal of the initial positions of states during the ozone regime.  
 Other key blocs were that of the south vs north and G-77, as well as the Umbrella 
coalition. The former is a standing coalition in the UN and includes many developing states and 
non-annex countries member to the protocol and is representative of the global south. The 
Umbrella group is an ad hoc bloc formed specifically during climate change negotiations post 
UNFCC and during Kyoto. Although a nonformal list, member states to the group include: 
Australia, Canada, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, Russia, the Ukraine and the US. With the 
exception of Japan and a few other import reliant states, most members can be thought of in the 
industrial paradigm above as high producers of cheap fossil-fuel energy. The name comes from 
their collective desire to be sheltered and protected from the EC position (Kesternich 2016, 
1053). There is some overlap between the G-77 and Umbrella coalition, however, two of the 
leading voices of the G-77—China and India—had a conflict of interest at times as their opinions 
about developing states’ roles often went against the view of other members of the Umbrella 
Group. As Depledge and Terhalle (2013) have pointed out, the great-power politics between the 
US and China have stalled many environmental negotiations. As a product of this competitive 
relationship, the US took an adversarial stance toward Kyoto and refused to commit itself to an 
agreement which would impose binding commitments on themselves and not on China. While 
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China ultimately ratified the protocol and the US did not, the US, as the informal leader of the 
veto coalition, was still one of the most influential players in early negotiations.  
 Similar to the posture the European Community took during initial negotiations of the 
ozone regime, the United States was hesitant to ratify anything with forceful commitments or 
restrictions on all members. Although they were the first developed nation to actually ratify the 
UNFCC, one of the main reasons it lacked binding commitments was because of pushback from 
the US (Sunstein 2007, 24). The clout that the US has as an international powerhouse, generally 
speaking, as well as one of the top three emitters to GHG makes them a crucial piece to the 
climate change puzzle—one whose voice and opinions carry a lot of weight. This is why it 
should follow that during initial negotiations on the Kyoto Protocol the US’ support for the 
inclusion of flexibility mechanisms was heeded, even though the US never actually ratified the 
protocol (Betsill and Fiske 2020, 286).30 
 After agreeing to negotiations about the protocol, the US, supported by the Umbrella 
group, pushed for more inclusion of flexible mechanisms and emissions trading. These countries 
saw the flexible mechanisms as a more palatable way to reduce their individual cost of 
commitment. The EC, and most developing countries, stood in opposition to this and worried 
that too much of an emphasis on the flexible mechanisms would allow developed states to avoid 
meaningful commitments (Betsill and Fiske 2020, 286; Marcoux and Urpelainen 186-187). The 
tension between the south and north is the most influential division to climate change 
negotiations outside of the unilateral power the US wields. Without the support from the top 
 
30 The opposing parties to this adjustment- the EU and developing countries- accepted the terms at the benefit of the 
US supporting reductions generally. This demonstrates the cost benefit analysis of flexibility mechanisms, while 
they can increase parties to an agreement, they can also weaken the objective. 
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emitters of the north, the problem is unlikely to be solved anytime soon, but with the south 
containing many developing countries with growing industries with clear potential to emit 
substantial GHG in the future they are also an essential part to a sustainable solution. However, 
the south has had much hesitancy to join onto an agreement which addressed a problem they see 
themselves as largely victim to, with very not at all responsible.   
 Sandler (2017) argues that the effects of climate change are felt evenly across states. 
However, this argument is flawed in that it both overlooks the uneven distribution of climate 
consequences geographically, and the unequal contribution to total GHG emissions by states 
(Najam 2020; Chasek and Downie 2017). This difference is effectively acknowledged by the 
Annex system for state commitments in the Kyoto Protocol. Furthermore, the current cost 
climate change poses—from the cost of repairing physical damage to reduced agricultural 
efficiency and new technology—estimates lowering GDP of developed nations by 1% or 2%, 
and by more than 5% for developing nations (Sunstein 2007, 32).  
 While the Annex system was supposed to create some equity and reaffirm CBDR 
amongst states, the reality of particular targets was that they were very much a result of self-
interest. Many top emitters were either not party to the agreement—United States and 
Australia—or were not under the Annex system and thus had no binding obligation—China and 
India. Evidently, most of the specific reductions states agreed to were at, or minimally above, 
what they had already achieved as a result of other developments. For example, Russia over 
delivered its promised reductions due to economic hardships that reduced their normal 
production levels, producing only 70% of their 1990 emission levels when they were apportioned 
up to 100% (Sunstein 2007, 27). Similarly, when Germany re-connected to its former East 
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Germany—which had low emission levels—the state’s merged emissions dropped to less than 
10% Germany’s. This reveals the lack of ambition that the protocol was able to garner (Sunstein 
2007, 27). While it was monumental in and of itself to establish an international agreement with 
binding commitments, the structure did not subvert individual state interests or international 
conflict enough to achieve major success. 
Kyoto Institutional Design Features and Related Negotiations  
 As argued in the previous chapter, the institutional design features of the Montreal 
Protocol, notably its balance between compliance and flexibility, was essential to its success 
(Faure 2020, 152-153). The institutional design of the Kyoto Protocol was purportedly modeled 
after this approach to compliance and flexibility in the Montreal Protocol (Sunstein 2007). If this 
is the case, then why have scholars accused Kyoto’s design as being riddled with flaws and a 
main culprit for its failures (Sandler 2016, 353; Rosen 2015, 31)?  
The Marrakesh Accords 
 After the Kyoto Protocol was adopted in 1997 the next prominent COP was in 2001 at 
COP-7 in Marrakesh, also known as the Marrakesh Accords. The Accord was a regulatory 
starting point and detailed some of the financial provisions of the regime as well as focused on 
the compliance mechanisms that supplemented the commitments made by developed sates in the 
Protocol (Savasan 2017, 155; Melkas 2007, 264). This was not an amendment to the Protocol but 
did discuss more details of the agreement (Andresen and Boasson 2012, 56). As such, the Accord 
preamble states:  
Recommends that the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to 
the Kyoto Protocol, at its first session, adopt a decision containing a framework on 
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capacity-building that reaffirms the framework annexed to the present decision with 
additional reference to priority areas for capacity-building relating to the implementation 
of the Kyoto Protocol. 
Some features established within the Accord were directly integrated into Kyoto, such as the 
financial mechanisms. To supplement the financial assistance offered through the Global 
Environmental Facility (GEF), Marrakesh established three other funds: the Special Climate 
Change Fund (SPCCF), Least-Developed-Country Fund (LDCF), and the Adaptation Fund 
(Wirth 2002). Importantly, the first two operate in pursuant to the UNFCC, while the Adaption 
Fund is specifically run through the Kyoto Protocol. All three of these funds, in addition to the 
GEF, are flexibility provisions, specifically they are labeled as applicational flexibility.All of the 
funds offer states considerably more resources to achieve their individual and collective goals. 
The Special Climate Change Fund is more sweeping than the other two, designed to finance 
projects and advance technology in different industries in order to diversify the economy 
(Chasek and Downie 2017, 178; Betsill and Fiske 2020, 287). The LDCF helps the least 
developed countries prepare and implement national projects, but it does not specifically assist 
with adaptation (Chasek and Downie 2017, 178; Betsill and Fiske 2020, 287). The consequences 
of this are that parties to the convention, and not the protocol, are still eligible to receive or 
contribute to financing. A symbiotic relationship was formed by the CDM and Adaption Fund, 
wherein certain proceeds from the developments were directly applied to the Adaption Fund 
(Wirth 2002, 651). These examples of applicational flexibility establish more equity amongst 
member states as developing countries are offered the assistance, they need to implement 
emission reduction projects. In other words, the funds even out the playing field.  
In addition to the financial funds, there were also some compliance provisions formalized 
during the Marrakesh Accords. Similar to Montreal, Kyoto’s compliance provisions were 
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designed to include non-adversarial elements, however, it creates a more elaborate compliance 
system by establishing two separate branches: the facilitative and the enforcement branches 
(Faure 2020, 152-153). The enforcement branch doles out consequences for noncompliance that 
were established collectively by member countries if they fail to reach their target. A 
noncompliance investigation is triggered if the expert review concludes their oversight with what 
is known as “questions of implementation.” Those states found in non-compliance for not 
submitting their state’s progress report were punished by becoming ineligible to use the Kyoto 
Flexible Mechanisms (which will be discussed in the next section) (Betsill and Fiske 2020, 286-
287). The more nonadversarial of the two is the facilitative branch. Similarly to Montreal’s 
compliance provisions, it is tasked with assisting all countries in their implementation of the 
protocol. Compared to the enforcement branch, the facilitate branch has been utilized less 
frequently. This could have been in response to Montreal which lacked any true enforcement 
mechanisms in aims of achieving greater aggregate success by holding states accountable 
(Goeteyn and Maes 2011, 816). The branch of enforcement was partially reactionary to the lack 
thereof in Montreal and was included to deter non-compliance before it even happened. The 
enforcement branch’s threat of potential punishment for non-compliance would encourage states 
to seek facilitation if they cannot achieve a goal. However, as an immediate safegaurd against 
too much flexibility, it does little to address the way states can exploit these provisions. 
In part due to the political push back from the Umbrella Group on binding legal 
consequences, the Marrakesh Accords deferred the question of the legal form of compliance until 
the first MOP after Kyoto entered into force  (Wirth 2002, 655). This decision showcases the 
continued power developed countries had in negotiations, especially at such a crucial and 
precarious case in the regime. Even though Kyoto had been adopted, it had not entered into force 
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and relied on the continued support from developed states to do so. The results of Marrakesh 
with the financial funds and the compliance mechanisms dually show the regimes approach to 
balance concerns of the south alongside the north.  
Kyoto Flexible Provisions 
 Independent of the typology I have assigned in this paper for flexibility provisions, the 
Kyoto Protocol formally established flexible provisions known specifically as the Kyoto 
Flexibility Mechanisms: clean development mechanisms (CDM), joint implementation (JI), and 
international emissions trading (IET). To briefly unpack these, the CDM allows for 
industrialized countries to invest in emissions reducing activities in developing countries in 
exchange for a certified emissions reduction applicable towards their personal emissions target 
(Kyoto Protocol, Article 12). The stated purpose of this mechanism is “to assist Parties not 
included in Annex I in achieving sustainable development and in contributing to the ultimate 
objective of the Convention, and to assist Parties included in Annex I in achieving compliance 
with their quantified emission limitation and reduction commitments under Article 3” (Kyoto 
Protocol, Article 12). Emissions trading allows developed states listed under Annex B, that 
exceed their allowed emissions, to purchase unused emission credits from other developed states 
to help meet their domestic targets (Kyoto Protocol, Article 17). Lastly, JI is similar to CDM in 
that it allows states to invest in other countries, however, this occurs between developed 
countries, not developed investing in developing. These mechanisms are designed to be 
beneficial for all parties involved, however, the benefits is most valuable to developed countries 
under Annex I, as the investing country is the party to receive an emissions reduction credit to 
apply to their individual target (Kyoto Protocol, Article 6). It is important to highlight that these 
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flexible mechanisms were intended to be supplemental to meeting domestic actions taken to 
reduce emissions in Annex-I countries’ own land. The goal was rather to make the overall 
success of the Protocol more achievable and equitable. During initial negotiations it was a 
concern of developing countries and the EC that these provisions would encourage states to 
avoid ambitious personal commitments. However, the Flexible Mechanisms were not intended to 
be the primary focus of the agreement nor the main path for achieving individual commitments.  
  All of the Kyoto Flexible Mechanisms are categorized as interpretive flexibility because 
of the leeway the mechanisms give states in how they decide to achieve their overall 
commitments. In other words, the mechanisms effectively allow states to have more freedom in 
how they calculate their individual state commitment (Betsill and Fiske 2020, 285-286).By 
offering the mechanisms but not requiring their use, states are able to use the mechanisms as they 
see fit, giving states more authority in the overall realization of their targets.  On the surface, the 
Flexible Mechanisms would offer more reassurance to the south that their position as developing 
countries would be situated at the center of discussion about projects and assistance would be 
directly offered to them. However, the south was hesitant to include heavy emphasis on Flexible 
Mechanisms because of fear of their misappropriation. 
 While the mechanisms were included as a way to create more equity amongst Annex and 
non-annex states, as well as avoid non-compliance by giving alternative options for individual 
success, as Melkas (2007) points out, they risked being counterproductive to these aims. Many of 
the mechanisms were exploited by wealthier countries and not only undermined their individual 
commitments, but disincentivized developing countries to themselves invest in projects in their 
own country. As a result of developed countries capitalizing first on all of the cheap options for 
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implementation, developing countries were left with less affordable options themselves (Melkas 
2007, 284-286). In theory, the CDM offers a unique tool that can both help remedy capacity 
problems by providing financial and technological aid to developing countries, while also 
reducing compliance costs for the developed country by giving them a cheaper alternative to buy 
emission rights (Faure 2020, 139). However, in practice this has not been the typical case. An 
incentive emerges for states to elect to use CDM rather than investing in emissions reduction in 
their own country, in effect diluting the objective of lowering their own emissions. Since 
developed states are generally larger contributors to global GHG emissions than developing 
countries, a project in a developing country would be less impactful than one in a developed 
country. This is a particularly attractive option as states would opt for the lowest marginal cost of 
production.31 Taking a pragmatic approach of self-interest, certainly most countries would invest 
in the cheapest options to achieve their obligations. However, this is a luxury reserved for 
wealthier nations. Those countries which utilize CDM are cross listed under Annex I, whereas 
those developing nations where the projects take place are not included under Annex I. The 
implication of this difference is that the developing countries—where CDM projects would be 
located—have no binding obligations to meet and therefore less incentive to invest in their 
countries. As a result of CDM being exploited, the most affordable options for emission 
reduction has already been capitalized on my developed countries, and developing countries 
have not only less incentive, but fewer viable options to achieve their own individual goals 
(Faure 2020, 140).  
 
31 A marginal cost of production is any additional cost incurred by preforming a task. Since developing countries are 
often cheaper to implement projects in, the marginal cost of establishing a project there, rather than in a developed 
country where it would be expensive, is marginally lower.  
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 Joint Implementation and CDM gave motivation for states to participate because they 
were cost effective options, but they exacerbated the sovereign equality of states as developed 
countries would dominate projects in developing states. The cost effectiveness entails another 
element of flexibility not yet defined, that of spatial flexibility. States were not restricted to just 
their territory to achieve the treaty’s aims. In some ways this could be viewed in the lens of a 
collective action problem. Since environmental disasters know no borders, it is appropriate to 
engage in collective investment regardless of state boundaries. 
 Above all other flexible mechanisms, CDM was most exploited by developed countries 
because of its emphasis on projects specifically within developing countries. Whereas, JI was 
between two developed countries and therefore, two more symmetrical powers (Melkas 2007). 
The inclusion of CDM, when evaluated in connection to the way state commitments were 
evaluated—by using net emissions reduced rather than a gross emission reduced—left even more 
room for exploitation (Rosen 2015, 42). States were able to avoid reducing production at home 
while paying for reductions elsewhere.  Even more overlooked than the exploitation of CDM 
was the fact that countries could shift domestic production overseas. Since carbon outputs were 
assigned to the country producing the GHG rather than consuming, outsourcing projects added to 
the emissions of the country producing the good, not necessarily the country funding or backing 
it. In practical terms, this means the overall objective of the treaty would be undermined as 
aggregate global emissions could increase while a state could simultaneously still achieve their 
individual goal. This can be demonstrated by the UK, which achieved well over its emission 
reduction goal of 8% less than 1990—achieving 18% less by 2008. However, this calculation 
overlooks the 20% increase the UK had in consumption-based emissions (Rosen 2015, 42). Due 
to concerns of overreliance on the flexible mechanisms, some states proposed a “Commitment 
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period reserve” as a fail-safe to avoid this by capping the amount of emission rights a state can 
trade (Wirth 2002, 652). This option, and other measures to limit the use of flexible mechanisms 
were generally favored by the EU and opposed by the Umbrella Group countries who saw it as 
an economic impediment (Wirth 2002, 652). 
Intense debate ensued over the eligibility for, and access to, the mechanisms (Chasek and 
Downie 2017). One point of contention was over the appropriateness of trading excess emissions 
for Annex I countries considered as economies in transition. For example, Russia had a large 
amount of unused emission rights which had been calculated as a result of their negative 
economic growth since the base year of 1990. However, Russia was still a top contributor to 
GHG emissions, and some saw these unused rights as not credible (Wirth 2002, 652). Even 
though there are numerous benefits to flexibility provisions—such as encouraging states to ratify 
an agreement and detracting from non-compliance because of the multiple options for achieving 
commitments—too much flexibility detracts from the legitimacy and effectiveness of an 
agreement.  
 Even though it is natural to immediately point to the Kyoto Flexible Mechanism when 
considering flexible provisions as a part of the institutional design of the agreement, there are 
other important examples. Much like the ozone regime relied on MOPs as the standard meeting 
structure for the Montreal Protocol, Kyoto instituted regularly convening MOPs in addition to 
the COPs set in place by the UNFCC. These meeting were used as a tool to continually readdress 
the progress of the protocol and success of the framework respectively. This would be an 
example of transformative flexibility since they allow commitments to be adjusted and shifted 
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over time. The constancy of the meetings made it an accessible and dependable tool for states of 
all capabilities, whether Annex I or not.  
 In addition to the three financial funds created during the Marrakesh Accords, the most 
recently established financial mechanism was the Green Climate Fund (GCF) created in 2010. 
The GCF was created as a financial mechanism to the UNFCC and was also targeted toward 
helping developing countries make advancements in climate resilience and low emission 
technology (Betsill and Fiske 2020). These funds were essential in helping create more 
opportunities for developing countries to achieve climate preparedness and contribute to the 
global effort to combat climate change. The funds have reached substantial capacities, 
considering the initial push back it received to mobilize funds, although the quantity is paling in 
comparison to what would be required to achieve success. One of the largest obstacles to enough 
funding is a lack of support from enough developed countries, whom see a limit to how much 
they should be responsible for helping developing states. As of spring 2018, the SPCCF has only 
received pledges from 15 countries and the LDCF received slightly more, with support from 26 
different countries (Betsill and Fiske 2020, 287). Funding deficiencies continue to be a through-
line in the climate change regime and was an initial barrier for negotiations for the Paris 
Agreement. The lack of financial support from a variety of countries indicates that flexibility 
included to create more equity for states can further create political tensions rather than appease 
them, especially when a voluntary part of a state’s commitment.  
Lastly, the most apparent form of flexibility outside of the Kyoto Mechanisms is the 
inclusion of the withdrawal clause, a type of adaptive flexibility (Kyoto Protocol, Article 27). 
After three years from the point that Kyoto entered into force, states had the ability to withdraw 
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from the protocol. Taking it one step further, if a party to the Convention and the Protocol were 
to withdraw from the convention they would also be considered to have withdrawn from the 
protocol since membership to the convention is required to join Kyoto.  
Kyoto Compliance Provisions 
The counterweight to flexibility for institutional design is that of compliance. Kyoto 
balanced the flexibility with an integrated non-compliance procedure that utilized the Flexible 
Mechanisms as a punitive measure—withholding the benefit of their use to any country found in 
non-compliance. The non-compliance procedures, established in article 8 of the Montreal 
Protocol, inspired the Kyoto Protocol with Kyoto’s own non-compliance measures. One element 
of improved compliance is the inclusion of an effective monitoring system to oversee states’ 
commitments. Kyoto built upon the extensive reporting requirements in the UNFCC, requiring 
emission inventory reports and national communications to showcase a varied effort within 
individual countries. Developed countries were to submit inventory reports annually and national 
communication every four to five years to be reviewed by an expert panel. The review is 
conducted by a third party to keep it as objective as possible and the results can include questions 
the panel has about the countries’ plans for implementation (Faure 2020, 145). The purpose of 
the panel’s feedback is to improve the capacity building of states and support them to achieve 
their individual goals. The Cancun conference in 2010 strengthened the review and reporting 
system by adding a biennial report on emissions that all parties are required to submit. This 
further increased the transparency of states’ progress towards their commitments (Faure 2020, 
145; Andresen and Boasson 2012, 54).  
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 Martimort and Sand-Zantman (2016) argue that Kyoto’s compliance features might 
actually face a credibility problem in that the mechanism was not effective in punishing non-
ratifiers to the treaty (Martimort and Sand-Zantman 2016). By not inducing ratification there is a 
greater possibility of free riding in which states gain the net benefit of other states contributions 
toward an agreement, without themselves taking any loss or personal cost by contributing to the 
solution (Martimort and Sand-Zantman 2016, 694). The possibility of free riding suggests that an 
optional compliance mechanism should take into account the impossibility of punishing non-
ratifiers. One non-formal approach to this is political pressure put on non-ratifying states from 
ratifying countries. Furthermore, the compliance structure took a more adversarial approach in 
contrast to the Montreal Protocol in that it required states to report each other, rather than states 
reporting themselves, as was the case with Montreal. In a sense, Kyoto’s compliance reporting 
creating an almost accusatorial environment which disincentivized countries from reporting one 
another out of fear of retribution. Another critique to Kyoto is its evenhanded compliance 
methods. Since, the 38 Annex I countries committed themselves to a certain level of emissions 
before any system of contributions and corresponding enforcement provisions were established, 
it can be argued that this made the resulting compliance structure more detrimental for them than 
non-Annex countries (Martimort and Sand-Zantman 2016, 694).  
 Young (2011) argues that compliance mechanisms are not the most important aspect to 
an agreement’s success, especially if the regime is not fundamentally regulatory in nature. 
However, I argue that the climate change regime, although not regulatory in nature, requires 
effective compliance provisions to ensure adherence to obligations. Without a system established 
to foster both collective support and deter from non-compliance, I do not believe there will be 
enough incentive, nor infrastructure, to collectively meet the goals of climate change MEAs. 
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This is one of the reasons scholars suggest the Kyoto Protocol was weak, because it did not have 
adequate compliance measures set up for non-Annex 1 countries (Martimort and Sand-Zantman 
2016; Sandler 2017). 
General Design Features of Kyoto 
 Another element of institutional design in Kyoto that has been subject to critiques is its 
time frame. While I have argued that it is beneficial to allow for continually ratcheting up 
commitments over time by states, the Protocol did not establish a clear enough path for this 
gradual acceleration of commitment. The open-ended promise of future agreements, and the 
initial five-year commitment, allowed for stagnation and a lack of long-term innovation or 
problem solving (Rosen 2015, 40). States were incentivized by the shorter time frame to meet 
their commitment through quicker fixes; which often meant a reliance on flexible mechanisms 
rather than changing the way their states fundamentally interacted with the environment and 
energy production. Furthermore, because the initial commitments were not progressive, but a flat 
percentage reduction within a small window averaging between 1-8 percent below 1990 levels, 
states had little encouragement to continue ratcheting up efforts past this point.   
Conclusion 
 The Kyoto Protocol was the first agreement in the climate change regime to mobilize 
collective efforts and set binding targets for GHG reductions to mitigate the effects of climate 
change. In this regard, it should be recognized for the milestone it achieved. However, when 
evaluating the success of the agreement, the results are rather dismal. Not only did the 
construction of the agreement fail to meet the urgency of the moment by setting lax flexibility 
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provisions without effective compliance mechanisms, but international conflict stopped the 
agreement short of achieving ambitious enough binding commitments. Lastly, while some might 
point out that many states reached their individual targets, this should not be confused with lack 
of success, but rather ineffectiveness. As some studies show, even if the agreement reached its 
commitments in full, the effects would be meager with reductions to projected warming only 
being mitigated by 0.03 °C over the next 100 years (Sunstein 2007, 33). This reveals one of the 
main flaws was of Kyoto; a lack of secured support with ambitious enough commitments from 
top emitting states and a lack of incorporation of developing states to eventually join with strong 
commitments of their own.  The results of Kyoto and the climate change regime show that as a 
global community we still have yet to find an agreement successful enough to avoid the worst 
damages of climate change. 
 Kyoto revealed deep divisions between top stakeholders and blocs that must be resolved 
in order to gain the support from top emitters such as China and the US. While CBDR was used 
as a lens to structure commitments in Kyoto through the Annex system and Flexible 
Mechanisms, neither were executed in a way that truly integrated developing countries into the 
fold. Unfortunately, these two structures became flaws and points of tension for the agreement. 
The Annex system, and uneven expectation of commitments between Annex and non-Annex 
states, caused key players to not ratify the agreement. The Flexible Mechanisms on the other 
hand were mainly exploited by wealthy countries and slowed progress from being achieved in 
developed countries’ own territory. The institutional design has been revealed to be a weak point 
for the protocol and one of the main reasons it failed (Rosen 2015, 32). However, I do not think 
these flaws call for scrapping all elements of the design for future agreements but, rather, 
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demands for a closer assessment of how we implement the design features in a more balanced 
manner.  
Chapter 5 ~ Comparing Montreal and Kyoto: Data Visualization of Relevant Emissions 
and Comparative Study of Institutional Design 
 
Introduction 
 As has been established, the Kyoto Protocol was based on the blueprints of the Montreal 
Protocol (Sandler 2016). Moreover, the ozone regime has been received by the world as an 
unparalleled success, both in terms of its negotiations and the outcome. The climate change 
regime, on the other hand, is still developing MEAs in hopes of being successful enough to 
combat the ever-growing threat of climate change. Unfortunately, Kyoto has proven to not be the 
model we need for international climate cooperation.  
 Even if Kyoto worked exactly as intended, and none of its Flexible Mechanisms were 
exploited by developed countries, global emissions would still not have been reduced enough to 
stop the earth’s already rising temperatures at a livable level (Rosen 2015, 35; Sunstein 2007, 
56). However, Kyoto wasn’t able to achieve its aims and importantly failed to secure ratification 
from the US, marking it as both ineffective and unsuccessful.  
 Although this paper has looked in depth at the respective regimes and their central 
protocols—including their general objectives, institutional design features, and some of the 
pivotal negotiations and international relations which directed such debate—this chapter seeks to 
close the gap and make direct comparisons between the two. Additionally, this chapter will use 
emissions data from the key states and negotiation blocs of the regimes respectively to further 
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assessment the outcome of the agreements. Data could have been used to characterize a number 
of relevant environmental indicators, but in an attempt to make a more clear comparison I have 
focused on two data sets related to state usage of ODS and GHGs—the two emission groups 
most consequential to the ozone and climate change regimes.  
 This chapter will proceed by first characterizing some of the general differences between 
the two regimes, looking at member states and the institutional design features of each protocol. 
The chapter will conclude by looking at the outcome of the regimes using graphs of key state 
emissions over time and highlighting specific pivotal years for the regime on the graph with 
vertical lines. This section will conclude by wrapping up and comparing the overall outcome of 
each protocol and the ways in which the two treaties diverged leading to such different results.  
Comparison of Protocols 
Members and commitments 
 The most apparent difference between the Montreal Protocol and the Kyoto Protocol is 
the lack of support from the US in Kyoto. While it may seem Eurocentric to focus on this, the 
fact of the matter is that US support is crucial for both the ozone and climate change regime to be 
successful (Rosen 2015, 31; Von Stein 2008). Not only is the US one of the top three emitters of 
GHGs globally, and similarly was a top producer of ODSs, but it also carries significant clout in 
the International Arena, enough that it could be pivotal in negotiations to crafting effective 
agreements and gaining support from other states. (Rosen 2015, 39; Sunstein 2007, 3; Wirth 
2002, 656). Additionally, the breadth of climate change is so large as to require participation 
from virtually every country, making a large coalition of active participants practically a 
 Lee 85 
prerequisite. On the other hand, ODS were produced and consumed by a relatively small number 
of countries making smaller coalitions a more accessible option (Sandler 2016, 354). 
 The scope of the ozone issue seemed to require less states to participate in an agreement 
in order to solve the issue. However, the Vienna Convention and corresponding Montreal 
Protocol went well beyond this required threshold and achieved universal ratification; an 
achievement laudable in its own right and even more so for an agreement with imposed binding 
obligations on all member states.  
 The division between the north and south was less evident during the Montreal Protocol, 
and especially during initial negotiations, as developing countries were not large users of ODS. 
Developing countries did have a perceived higher cap of future potential use of ODS and were 
granted a 10-year grace period for the phase-out dates of ODS, yet ODS have never had the same 
association with national growth or date development as GHG. The different relationship 
between ODS and GHG with state development generates a lower level of perceived unfairness 
when asking developing states to limit the use the chemicals and an easier pathway to create 
more equity with something as easily implemented as a 10-year grace period (Najam 2020). On 
the otherhand, the climate change regime faces a much larger veto collation from the Global 
South, which makes balancing implementing CBDR in a way that is also acceptable to the north 
more difficult to juggle. (Longden and Mattei 2014, 27; Sandler 2016; Chasek and Downie 2017; 
Najam 2020) 
 In order to recognize CBDR, and create more variation in states’ responsibilities, Kyoto 
chose to develop an annex system. Although it set individualized targets for each country, it was 
only binding on a select number of developed countries included in Annex B. Furthermore, the 
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commitment only came in one form, “absolute targets and timetables, tied to historical 
emissions” (Bodansky 2007, 65). The regime could have benefited from a wider range of 
approaches, such as initial targets that could be added to and increased over time, similar to the 
indexed targets Montreal included, or induce some tax system or efficiency standards.  
 Although the exemption from binding targets on non-annex states was instrumental in 
attaining high participation from developing countries, the exemption is worrisome as total GHG 
emissions from the BRICS contributes a huge portion of today’s total emissions. “In fact, China 
now has a larger carbon footprint than the USA” (Sandler 2016, 353-354). Furthermore, Political 
tension was exacerbated by this stark divide in responsibility between Annex and non-Annex 
countries and was a point of contention between the leading countries of both the north and 
south. It was revealed by the Bush administration that this was the main reason for the US 
refusing to ratify the protocol (Sunstein 2007, 28). Montreal on the other hand, was able to 
address differences between developing and developed states in a more even keeled way, which 
eased political division. By imposing binding commitment on all member states, Montreal was 
able to guarantee participation from all ratifiers. From this starting point it was easier for the 
Protocol to make exceptions and distinctions between the north and south with the 10-year grace 
period gives to developing countries.  
 It should be noted that one difference, which is irrelevant to the design of the treaties and 
their respective regimes, is the economics and science surrounding the environmental issues they 
concerned. For the ozone regime, the market conditions made switching to an alternative to 
CFCs—one of the central ODS—a worthwhile and relatively easy switch (DeSombre 2001. Not 
only were the production and consumption of CFCs largely isolated to only a dozen or so 
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countries, but there were already affordable alternatives being developed at the time of early 
negotiations (Faure 2020, 137). Such isolated production and consumption has not been the case 
for the climate change regime. Unlike ODS, GHG are not just used, but heavily relied on for the 
functioning of nearly every single county on the planet. Even though there is a growing list of 
more sustainable alternatives to fossil fuels and are investment in renewables has expanded at 
much more rapid pace over the last decade or so, our deeply rooted global reliance on GHG 
makes economic detachment much more complicated (Sandler 2016; Chasek and Downie 2017; 
Sunstein 2017). The intricately linked relationship between GHG emissions and our global 
operations creates not only a much high tradeoff cost for transitioning economies and industries, 
but also creates an added element of external pressure on government from energy lobbyists.  
 Additionally, at the time of the agreement’s formation the science behind the ozone 
depletion had much stronger confirmation from the scientific community compared to the 
science on anthropogenic climate change. It is true that the European Community, voiced 
concerns over the certainty of the science during initial ozone debates, but they quickly agreed to 
the reality. Furthermore, “by the time that the Montreal Protocol was introduced, the scientists 
who advanced the theory behind the CFC explanation for ozone depletion had already been 
awarded the Nobel Prize in Chemistry for their work (refer to Molina & Rowland (1974) for the 
paper)” (Longden and Mattei 2014, 24-25). Anthropogenic caused climate change is still a 
debated topic for some and was most certainly questioned at the time of the UNFCC. Even 
though most people, and certainly all credible scientists, do not deny the facts at hand, the small 
amount of uncertainty gives room for many states to claim that the evidence is too weak to 
justify international action; it continues to be a point of continuous debates to this day. 
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Nonetheless, the precautionary cause should supersede any remaining scientific uncertainty, as 
waiting would be detrimental to our planet and ourselves.  
Institutional Design  
 It is undeniable that the mathematics of climate change make it a much costlier and more 
complicated issue to tackle than ozone depletion, however the economic differences was not 
cause of such different results. The climate change regime had, and still does have, the potential 
to create a well structure institutional design with balanced flexibility and compliance provisions. 
 One of the largest impediments to Kyoto and the climate change regimes’ growth was 
that it lacked the continual mandated cutback commitment that Montreal achieved (Sandler 
2016). Montreal was able to create a positive feedback with each new commitment period 
securing another step towards reducing ozone depletion, where as Kyoto required renegotiation 
at every step. The initial negotiations were difficult enough, and lost the support from key 
players, which made renegotiation even more perilous a prospect. While Montreal has been 
adjusted and  amended several times since it first entered into force, Kyoto’s second commitment 
period has only just this past year reached the threshold to enter into force. Even though Kyoto 
used annual MOPs just like the MOPs of Montreal, there were a few key differences. Firstly, for 
the ozone regime, there was one track with parties to both the Vienna Convention and Montreal 
Protocol attending the MOPs. For the climate change regime two tracks developed, one working 
the UNFCC and its member states, and another within Kyoto and its member states. There was a 
lot of overlap between the membership of Kyoto and the UNFCC, however the two sets of 
dialogues created discontinuity and notably had the US party to one and not the other, 
respectively (Chasek and Downie 2017, 164-175). Moreover, the adjustments provisions added 
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at the MOP for Montreal became immediately binding on all member states to the protocol 
(Article 2, Section 9 of the Montreal Protocol). The centrality of having one chain of negotiation 
for the ozone regime, and the immediacy of adding new provisions without renegotiations, 
provided valuable simplicity to the regime which climate change was lacking (Downie 2020, 
107; Chasek and Downie 2017).The different approaches support the design that future treaties 
should first aim to secure high participation with easily integrated additional cutbacks rather than 
cap aggregate greenhouse gas emissions. 
 Montreal was able to stack and layer adjustments and amendments to strengthen the 
overall regime through its MOP structure. Whereas the climate change regime had more trouble 
connecting and building upon existing agreements through MOPs. Because some pivotal states 
did not ratify the Kyoto Protocol, new commitments in Kyoto did not impose new commitments 
on all member states to the UNFCC (Espelage, Hoch, Micelowa, and Weber 2019, 600). In 
addition, further fragmentation occurred in the Kyoto Protocol since certain facets of the 
agreement—like the Flexible Mechanisms and the Clean Developments—did not apply to all 
countries. “As a result, negotiations are taking place in separate tracks for the UNFCCC and the 
KP” (Espelage, Hoch, Micelowa, and Weber 2019, 600).   
 Another element of the climate change regime which has proven to be much more 
fragmented, and by virtue less effective than the ozone regime, is financial support. For the 
ozone regime, the policy instrument is simplified to basically one device: the Multilateral Fund 
for the Implementation of the Montreal Protocol (Article 5, Montreal Protocol). The fund has 
seen enough successful contributions from countries that it has approved expenditure projects 
totally a few billion dollars (Espelage, Hoch, Michelowa, and Weber 2019, 605). On the other 
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hand, the climate change regime has a few different funds with slightly different objectives and 
goals. The main fund, which provides assistance for the Kyoto Protocol and other projects within 
the climate change regime and UNFCC, is the Green Climate Fund (GCF) and the Global 
Environmental Facility (GEF). Three other subsidiary funds are: the Special Climate Change 
Fund (SPCCF), Least-Developed-Country Fund (LDCF), and the Adaptation Fund (Wirth 2002). 
While all of the funds aim to provide financial and technological assistance to member states, 
with particular attention applied to aiding developing countries, the LDCF specifically targets 
assistance at the least developed countries. Rather than the central Multialateral Fund for the 
ozone regime, the climate change regime seems to be a problem of too few eggs in too many 
baskets, spreading resources thin and rendering them ineffective. All of the funds fall victim to 
underfunding and deficient support for the developed countries whose backing would be most 
decisive in alleviating the developing states shortages.  
 In terms of compliance provisions, Montreal was able to incorporate an effective system 
which deterred noncompliance from member and non-member states. Effective compliance 
measures effectively incentivized ratification and also substantially reduced the potential for 
leakage. Because the Montreal Protocol imposed binding emission targets on all of its parties, 
rather than just annex states for Kyoto, trade restriction against nonparties could be imposed in a 
nondiscriminatory manner (Hovi and Skodvin 2008). In comparison, Kyoto and the climate 
change regime found it difficult to enforce compliance evenly amongst its members and were 
unable to effectively punish nonmember states adding the leakage concern already inherent to 
climate change (Sandler 2016). Overall, the record of non-compliance under the Montreal 
Protocol was much lower than that of Kyoto. However, the low levels of non-compliance cannot 
be attributed solely to the compliance structure of the agreements and rather, are a result of a 
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number of converging factors (Savasan 2019). Montreal benefits from supplying states the 
ability to report when they are unable to comply with their commitments, rather than only states 
being able to report other states, as is the case with Kyoto. Not only is this problematic for 
Kyoto, since this severely limits compliance to only annex states, but furthermore results show 
that states almost never report other states noncompliance. As is the case with the Montreal 
protocol, there have been no cases to date of states reporting another states noncompliance 
(Savasan 2019, 141; Goeteyn and Maes 2011, 806). Kyoto also strays from Montreal in its 
establishment of two separate bodies for compliance: the enforcement and facilitative branch 
(Faure 2020, 152-153). The two-branch approach has been positively reviewed by some as the 
key to an effective compliance mechanism (Goeteyn and Maes 2011, 801-802).  
 Lastly, it is important to compare the flexibility provisions incorporated into each 
agreement. On its surface the most stark contrast between the two treaties is that the Kyoto 
Protocol explicitly has Flexible Mechanisms built into it, whereas for Montreal flexibility is 
incorporated in more veiled ways. For Montreal, the greatest flexibility is woven in through the 
MOP, adjustment provisions, and Multilateral Fund—all of which have been explained more in 
depth above. Upon first glance, the Kyoto Flexible Mechanisms appear to offer incentives for 
developed states to concurrently achieve their individual commitments and assist developing 
states with clean project growth. However, in conjunction with the annex system, the 
mechanisms were not utilized in an effective manner. Under Montreal, states with different 
levels of consumption and production are similarly entitled to trade their credits with another 
country; the difference is that for Montreal this included all member states, not just developed 
ones (Melkas 2007, 255). In theory the CDM and JI would allow for states to individually meet 
their goals and collectively achieve the agreement’s overall aims; developed countries resorted to 
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these mechanisms as opposed to reducing emissions in their own states. Furthermore, the 
flexibility offered to developed states came at the expense of developing states who were left 
with more expensive options in their home country if they chose to pursue independent projects 
(Melkas 2007, 276). 
Graphs and Assessment of Outcomes  
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 The graph above shows the total per capita consumption of ODS by key members of the 
Toronto group, one of the original most influential negotiating blocs of the ozone regime. The 
proceeding graphs for this section represent different negotiating blocs of the ozone regime, 
however, all of the graphs represent the same per capita consumption of ODS. Similarly, on all 
three graphs the three vertical dashed lines represent dates of key negotiations for the regime: 
The Montreal Protocol entering into force (1989), The London Amendment and Adjustment 
(1990), and the Montreal Adjustment (2007). Any gaps in the horizontal line representing the 
emissions of the states are from holes in the data and lack of reporting from states in the 
corresponding year. While all of the graphs show per capita consumption, the values on the y-
axis are adjusted accordingly to scale for each negotiating bloc analyzed. 
 The Toronto group were early proponents of ODS restrictions and pushed for more 
ambitious phaseout dates of CFCs, as well as inclusion of more chemicals. It is indicated that 
many of these states had already begun implementing reductions in certain ODS prior to the 
Vienna Convention. Although there is no comprehensive data on ODC consumption prior to the 
ozone regime’s formation, it is still evident from the years before the first vertical dashed line—
the start of the Montreal Protocol—that after negotiations began the member states had begun 
reduction. As noted above, as well as chapter 3, production and consumption of ODS was limited 
to only a dozen or so countries. All members of the Toronto Group consumed ODS, but it is 
visible that some countries consumed more than others. For example, Switzerland’s per capita 
consumption was the lowest of all member states, and after 1995, reduced sharply. All of the 
countries above show a steady and gradual reduction in consumption, consistent with the 
phaseout dates of ODS in the Montreal Protocol. Interestingly, after the Montreal Adjustment—
the last notable change to the protocol—reductions  in consumption stagnated, increased, or 
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slowed for all of the states. The plateauing could represent a shift in attitude from the Toronto 
group, which were more concerned about increased restriction against HCFC  imposed by the 




 The other main negotiating bloc during early ozone discussions was the European 
Community. I have included both Central and Eastern Europe since at the time the European 
Union had not been formally established (Chasek and Downie 2017, 111). In comparison to the 
members of the Toronto Group, we see a steep decline in production rather than a gradual 
decrease consistent with the states pictured above. Whilst records were not well kept prior to 
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Montreal, the first plot mark indicates Europe’s relatively high consumption of ODS; especially 
that of Eastern Europe, which had the highest per capita consumption aside from the US in the 
base year. This is consistent with Europe’s initial hesitancy to commit to steep reductions 
(Skjœrseth 2012). The European Community veto bloc quickly yielded to the Toronto Group 
after the Montreal Protocol. After the London Amendment the EC drastically reduced their 
consumption and production. By the time of the Montreal Adjustment in 2007, Europe’s 
consumption showed high reductions, contributing to their willingness to accept steeper 
commitments since they had already achieved such large reductions (Chasek and Downie 2017, 
118).    
 
Figure 3 
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 The Global South and emerging economies of the BRICS were a less prominent 
negotiating bloc for the ozone regime, nonetheless, their concerns were still very relevant and 
influential. By the time of the Montreal Adjustment in 2007, India and China had gained 
prominence and sway as world leaders and were especially hesitant to agree to reductions on 
HCFCs (Chasek and Downie 2017). China appears as an outlier in terms of consumption against 
all of the BRICS, which mirrors their dominance in the global arena as arguably the most 
powerful of all developing countries (Najam 2020; Skjœrseth 2012). Their decrease in ODS 
consumption shows the slowest drop in comparison to Brazil, South Africa, and India, which all 
had more drastic cut offs after the London Amendment in 1990. 
  
Figure 4 (NASA animation)32 33 
 
32 NASA animation (1979-2011) by Robert Simmon, using imagery from the Ozone Hole Watch. 
33 NASA Earth Observatory images (2017) by Jesse Allen, using visuals provided by the NASA Ozone Watch team. 
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 The images above are projections of the ozone at the south pole provided by NASA. The 
image deviates from the focus on individual states to show the collective collective results of 
countries’ actions and commitments from the ozone regime. The more purple the center of the 
graphic by the core, the less amount of ozone present. It should be noted that the 1979 to 2011 
projections use a scale of 700 to 0 total ozone, whereas the 2017, and most recent projection, 
shows 100 units at its lowest extreme. This progression of photos shows the success of the 
regime in returning the stratospheric ozone concentrations to healthy levels. From 1979 to 
1987—right before the ozone regime and initial negotiations started two years after the Vienna 
Convention—there is a clear and drastic decrease in the ozone levels at the pole. Although there 
was action taken with the Convention, and later the Protocol, there was a delay in recovery at the 
poles and the problem worsened. It is not until 2006 that we began seeing positive signs of 
recovery. The 2017 image shows that the ozone is recovering at a steady and healthy rate and is 
in line with the scientific reporting that indicates a full recovery near the year 2050 (Downie 
2020, 110).  
 All of the individual state consumptions graphed above are congruent with this progress. 
Every major negotiating bloc demonstrates a gradual decline in ODS Consumption; even if at 
times consumption stagnated briefly or bumped back up, the overall trajectory was towards the 
reduction required to see the increase in ozone levels at the arctic pole shown above. The 
Montreal Protocol was an instrumental tool for the ozone’s recovery , without the structure of the 
Protocol it is unlikely that we would have been able to successfully confront a seemingly 
insurmountable environmental crisis.  
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 This graph shows the total per capita emissions of CO2 by key members of the Umbrella 
Group, one of the original most influential negotiating blocs of the climate change regime. The 
proceeding graphs for this section represent different negotiating blocs of the climate change 
regime, however, all of the graphs represent the same data on per capita emissions of CO2. 
Likewise, on all three graphs the four vertical dashed lines represent dates of key negotiations for 
the regime: The Rio Conference which lead to the UNFCC (1992), The Marrakesh Accord 
(2001), the year the Kyoto Protocol entered into force (2005), and the Copenhagen Accord 
(2009). Any gaps in the horizontal line representing the emissions of the states are from holes in 
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the data and lack of reporting from states in the corresponding year. While all of the graphs show 
per capita consumption, the values on the y-axis are adjusted accordingly to scale for each 
negotiating bloc analyzed. 
 Out of the six states pictured in figure 5, only four of them are current members to the 
Kyoto Protocol and subsequent amendments. The United States never ratified the agreement and 
Canada later withdrew. However, they are included in the graphic above because they were both 
vocal members of the Umbrella Group: an informal collection of states all of whom supported 
less strict commitments and greater flexibility in agreements (Kesternich 2016, 1053; Chasek 
and Downie 2017, 174). One of the main reasons for their apprehension toward steep 
commitments was the high cost it would take each to adjust as such high emitters of GHGs. 
Norway was a part of the Umbrella Group initially, however its interests and emission trajectory 
followed more on par with the EU. The Umbrella Group coalition was most vocal during the 
negotiations between Rio and Marrakesh. The Umbrella Group was able to incorporate higher 
levels of flexibility within the agreement, but they were not able to receive all of the reduced 
compliance measures they had hoped for, largely due to push back from the EU (Marcoux and 
Urpelainen 2013, 186). These concessions were not enough to gain the U.S.’s support and the 
country’s emissions show the highest per capita results out of all of the countries above. While 
the US’ overall per capita emissions are much higher than the other states, interestingly the 
growth and steady increase in emissions tracks with the member states to Kyoto. The parallel 
between the US and Annex-I countries demonstrates a failure on behalf of the Protocol to cause 
reduction in emissions from key players more than they would have already been inclined to do. 
Since the fig. 5 shows emissions produced within states, the results of Kyoto might look slightly 
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different since state commitments are calculated using the Flexible Mechanisms, which includes 
subtractions from projects in other countries.  
 
Figure 6 34  
 The EU was the earliest negotiating bloc to push for tighter commitments and urged for 
less flexibility—worried that it would be a cause for non-compliance (Marcoux and Urpelainen 
2013, 186). In comparison to the states in the Umbrella Group, the EU is the only bloc to show a 
steady decrease in emissions after the formation of the climate change regime and start of Kyoto. 
The EU’s emission reductions demonstrate some level of success and accounts for a large 
 
34 There are some overlaps in countries represented amongst these regional categories. Furthermore, the main 
relevant group and corresponding graph to the regime and negotiations is the European Union. There were distortion 
problems isolating just this graph, so all four remain. They all provide interesting insight, but the most pertinent one 
I will be discussing is the emissions of the European Union. 
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reduction in aggregate emissions. After every negotiation highlighted on the map there is, for the 
most part, a corresponding decrease in emissions. However, the growth in production from other 
states would render any net emissions the EU helped achieve moot.  
 
Figure 7 
 The countries shown above all represent the BRICS, and in a larger sense the Global 
South. While many consider the Global South and developing countries to be less consequential 
participants in GHG reductions, the projections above show otherwise. These countries may have 
been historically small emitters, but they are all on a path of exponentially rising emissions that 
in some cases they emit more than some of the developed countries under Annex-I of the Kyoto 
Protocol. The reality of the BRICS rising emissions gives substance to the US’ criticism that 
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developing countries should also be held accountable for their emissions. If the US had ratified 
Kyoto they would have had to reduce their own emissions, in effect reducing their industry, 
whilst China was allowed to grow their emissions considerably between the UNFCC and 2014 
(the last point on the graph available). However, it should be noted that China may appear as an 
outlier with its rate of emissions outpacing all other developing countries, even those of the 
BRICS.  
 China’s projections above, coupled with the continuously high emissions from the US, 
clearly emphasize that while a successful climate change agreement must secure support from 
negotiating blocs like the South and EU, it most importantly needs to secure meaningful 
commitment from the two top emitting states. As Depledge and Terhalle (2013) have pointed 
out, the great-power politics between these two countries is the predominant obstacle for most 
environmental negotiations. In summary, 
We can now see a real obstacle to an international agreement to control greenhouse 
gases. The United States and China are the largest emitters, and according to prominent 
projections, they also stand to lose relatively less from climate change. In terms of their 
own domestic self-interest, these projections weaken the argument for stringent controls. 
The nations of Africa stand to lose a great deal, but they are trivial greenhouse gas 
emitters. India is even more vulnerable, and its contribution, while not exactly trivial, is 
modest. (Sunstein 2007, 53) 
Unlike the ozone regime’s continual reduction in ODS emissions, the climate change regime 
shows regression in emission reductions outside of a few countries—none of which are 
significant enough to sway the results of the regime. None of the significant negotiations 
highlighted on the graphs above show much tangible results in emission cutbacks. Since there is 
no mandated cutback period woven in Kyoto, the next climate change MEA should modify itself 
to show more consistent results in reduction for all member states. 
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Conclusion 
 There is bound to be natural differences between agreements of two separate 
environmental regimes, however the comparison above between Kyoto and Montreal reveal the 
importance of institutional design and provide some compelling guidance for successful 
agreement construction. Firstly, both Kyoto and Montreal reveal the utility in having consistent 
and regularly scheduled convening of member states to discuss agreement progress, either in the 
form on MOPs or COPs. However, Montreal, and the flexibility it achieved through adjustment 
provisions secured during MOPs, was vital in securing support and commitment without 
unnecessary negotiation. Secondly, Montreal proves that securing some level of binding targets 
across all member states is a successful strategy. Not only does it guarantee actions from all 
countries, but it also helps avoid the political disapproval from the north that the south is being 
let off to easily. Furthermore, by including continual mandated cutback commitments rather than 
requiring discrete commitments with renegotiations, such as with Montreal greater progress can 
be made (Sandler 2017). Montreal highlights that it is preferable to start in a modest fashion with 
smaller commitments, but importantly binding commitments , on all member states and make 
them stricter over time. This supports Young’s (2011) view that agreements should be able to 
change and evolve overtime, and furthermore that IEAs should increase their strictness over time 
(Young (2016) . Thirdly, a balanced institutional design sets the foundation for a successful 
agreement. Both treaties could improve on their compliance, especially Kyoto, which failed to 
balance effective compliance with abused Flexible Mechanisms. It should be noted that 
Montreal’s facilitative compliance and self-reporting was more fruitful than Kyoto’s reliance on 
reporting from other states, which speaks to the importance of facilitation as a tool of non-
compliance in addition to enforcement and punitive measures.  
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 From Kyoto we have seen the limitations of a top-down approach to international climate 
agreements, pointing to the potential usage of a bottom-up approach. This bottom-up approach 
would give states more flexibility in implementation without jeopardizing the maintaining of 
deep commitments from all members (Kinley 2019, 189). Furthermore, by giving more 
autonomy to the states themselves, non-compliance would be deterred, and ratification 
encouraged. The Paris Agreement picked up on this method and accordingly went the route of 
states each instating their own emission reduction goals or, Nationally Determined 
Contributions. Paris is more aligned with Montreal in this regard that unlike Kyoto it does not 
impose any Annex system. If Paris is able to take away the lessons learned from these two 
regimes and implement it in an effective manner, there is hopes that it can be more successful 
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Chapter 6 ~ The Future of the Climate Change Regime with Paris: What we’ve learned 
from Montreal and Kyoto 
Important Dates  
Treaty  Number of Ratifiers35 Year Started  
Doha Agreement 147 2012 
Paris Agreement 191 2016 
First Global Stocktake NA 2023 
Introduction 
 It has been 5 years since the Paris Agreement entered into force. As we approach the 
deadline for the first global stocktake, it is relevant to look to the future of the Paris Agreement 
and the climate change regime more generally to see how we can maximize the success.  
 A good international agreement must do three things: attract broad participation from key 
states and negotiating blocs, deter countries from not complying, and lastly combine the two and 
achieve countries to both participate and comply with an agreement that has substantiable 
commitments, enough to be successful at solving the environmental problem at hand. We have 
seen both extreme levels of success and failures in our analysis of some of the most prominent 
agreements of the ozone and climate change regime. From the comparison of Montreal and 
Kyoto we have deduced that a balanced institutional design can lead to greatly attribute to an 
agreement’s success. As Young (2011) points out, institutional design may be the largest single 
factor to contribute to an international environmental regime’s outcome. With this in mind, this 
 
35 This number includes Palestine and its occupied territories as a member state.  
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chapter turns attention to how we can apply these finding to the Paris Agreement and what 
results are likely to occur as things currently stand. 
COP 21 and Paris 
 The 21st COP to the UNFCC ushered in unprecedented levels of global cooperation on 
climate change as more heads of states and governments convened under one roof than at any 
other time in history. While there were a number of disagreements and dissenting states, the 
outcome of the meeting exceeded most everyone’s expectations (Kinley 2019, 189) 
 Even though there was some dissenting during COP 21, overall there was reportedly a 
high level of optimism and momentum not achieved at any climate change COP since Kyoto in 
1997. There were many achievements at the COP, but most notably: climate change action had 
shifted from a top-down to a bottom-up approach; the temperature goal of limiting warming 
below 2 degrees Celsius is enshrined in Paris and nationally recognized as a goal; the inclusion 
of both a long term goal of climate change mitigation with the tangible temperature goal in 
tandem; the establishment of the global stocktake; a more nuanced approach to country 
differentiation and CBDR than just a binary north vs south divide; adaptation and not just 
mitigation was a focus the agreement (Kinley 2019, 189-190). Even without the first global 
stocktake occurring, these are remarkable feats that should be viewed as a success in their own 
right. It is contingent on the results of these stocktakes whether the outcome of the agreement 
itself will be successful. However, as Bill McKibben has said, “The most compelling thing you 
can say about Paris is not that it saved the planet, but that it saved the chance of saving the 
planet” (Kinley 2019, 192 qqtd. Hood 2016). 
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 One of the reasons COP 21 was such a success, is that international conflict seemed to 
simmer and a spirit of compromise took precedent. The compromise was partially a result of the 
advancements in technology, which make mitigation more feasible, and partially because of the 
increase in damaging storms and other climate consequences which forced the isse. In other 
words, the seriousness and urgency of the problem demanded nothing less” (Kinley 2019, 192). 
Strong leadership from the G77 and China made sure developing countries and their unique 
concerns were at the center of discussions (Kinley 2019, 192). 
 There was also a strong pushback from the US and its allies, namely those of the 
Umbrella Group from Kyoto negotiations who sought for weaker provisions and goals (Raman 
2019, 175). Similar arguments from the US during Kyoto resurfaced, in which they wanted 
“developed and developing countries to be treated in a like manner legally” (Raman 2019, 176). 
 Even with all of these ‘achievements’, there still exists plenty of room for criticism. For 
one, the goal of limiting warming below 2 degrees Celsius seems to contradict the UNFCC 
objective of avoiding significant harm to the environment, as even warming to this degree would 
result in the need of serious adaptation. There have even been talks to lower this temperature 
standard to 1.5 degrees, yet there exists no set plans for how we can achieve this. Furthermore, 
with the NDC as currently stands, warming is calculated to exceed this 2-degree threshold 
(Spash 2019, 197; Raman 2019, 187). Some argue that Paris has further disregarded attempts of 
avoiding the damage UNFCC set out to curb with the inclusion of the adaptation measures 
(Spash 2019, 198). However, I see this inclusion as a necessary one to face the reality of our 
current situation.  
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 Other criticism of the Paris agreement is its lofty goals with no real plan of execution—
such as encouraging adaption without any financial assistance or the promotion of innovation for 
long term solutions but without the requirement of new technology (Spash 2019, 198). There is 
not even a mention of specific GHG sources, nor a single mention of fossil fuel use. Similarly, 
there are no means of enforcement, and as we have learned from Kyoto and Montreal, a 
compliance system needs some tool to have effective non-compliance measures aside from the 
necessary facilitative and non-adversarial roles (Spash 2019, 198). I agree with Spash (2019) that 
the decoupling of economics from energy policy is a weakness of the agreement as it ignores the 
reality of the financial interest of the industry. Furthermore, the fossil fuel reserves already 
known represent high economic value, and if tapped into, would lead to warming well in excess 
of the current goal. Even though a shift to renewable energy promises jobs and growth, there will 
be a delay in this realized potential as the energy sector transitions away from fossil fuel. 
However, longevity of our planet and the economic futures of generations to come takes priority 
from any slowed economic growth in the interim.   
 COP 21 and Paris provide hope, but Paris’ current commitments are is not enough. NDC 
needs to be strengthened immediately as current NCD still have the planet on course to warm 
closer to 3 degrees Celsius preindustrial. It is now the challenge of moving the words and 
motivation of COP21 into tangible action and a mobilized effort from the international 
community (Kinely 2019, 193). 
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Global Temperatures Currently 
 
Figure 8 
 As we can see from a variation of the famous hockey stick graph above, global 
temperatures have been rising at an exponential rate since about the time of the industrial 
revolution. If we were to graph the total emission of CO2 in the atmosphere, it would track at a 
nearly parallel rate to the global temperature increase in fig.1. This parallel demonstrates an 
indisputable correlation and scientifically backed relationship to our planet’s rising temperatures. 
Global emissions are currently still on an upwards trajectory, but the Paris Agreement has the 
potential to cause these temperatures plateau if stricter measures are taken. While the 
temperature of Earth has been rising at a consistent rate, the heating of the globe has not been felt 
evenly amongst the countries. The heat map in fig. 2 shows that in some regions warming has, 
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and will continue to be, much greater than in other parts of the globe. Correspondingly, the cost 
of damage and reduction in productivity as a result of climate change is going to affect different 
regions and states unevenly. The damage resulting from a 2.5 ˚C warming for a few key states 
and regions is listed in the table of fig.3 represented by a percentage loss of GDP. 
 
Figure 9 
 (Berkeley Earth. Global Temperature Report for 2019. Available 
at: http://berkeleyearth.org/archive/2019-temperatures/.) 
 It is notable that for many developing states in the global south will face a 
disproportionate amount of the warming and consequences from climate change, even though in 
ost cases they have contributed the least to the problem. This creates a further inequity amongst 
the states, which I argue supports the fact that CBDR should place the majority of the 
responsibility on the north. That is not to say that the south should not contribute, I believe that 
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they are a crucial piece of the puzzle and should have binding commitments just as the north, 
however, their efforts should be proportional to their situation.  
Damage Resulting From a 2.5 ˚C Warming as a Percentage of GDP  
 
Figure 10 
 (Sunstein 2007, 48) 
 If these figures do not paint a compelling picture of the dire situation of our planet, I do 
not know what does. It would only put states at a disadvantage to continue to delay making 
meaningful commitments. The cost of inaction, as represented by fig. 3, far outweighs the short-










 Figure 4 shows different projections for our planet’s warming. As currently stands with 
state commitments under Paris we are better positioned than if no agreement were to exist. This 
is encouragement to show the tangible results state actions can have on our planet, just as it did 
with the Montreal Protocol and the ozone. However, with the current NCD, the planet is still on 
track to rise within margins exceeding the Paris agreement’s goal of 2 ˚C, let alone the more 
ambitious target of 1.5 ˚C. However, the bottom green line indicates that there is a pathway for 
limiting warming within this 1.5 ˚C margin. It is important to be reminded that Paris can be 
tailored to increase its chances of success and accomplish this goal. The primary way it can 
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achieve this is by structuring for regular accelerations of state commitments. As Young (2016) 
has stated: 
The Montreal Protocol on ozone-depleting substances (ODSs), often thought of as the 
gold standard in these terms, has been able to ratchet up commitments both by 
accelerating phaseout schedules for those chemicals already covered and by adding more 
chemicals to the list of those covered under the terms of the agreement … By contrast, 
few if any countries were prepared to ratchet up their commitments to reducing 
greenhouse gas emissions under the terms of the Kyoto Protocol at the close of the first 
commitment period in 2012…This suggests that the trick is to craft arrangements 
allowing for step-by-step strengthening of initial commitments and to muster the political 
will needed to make use of these procedures effectively (125-124) 
One of the simplest ways that the Paris Agreement can implement this is by granting the 
authority to the COP/MOP to amend existing provisions without requiring a formal ratification, 
as was the case with Montreal. As of now, the main mechanism for raising ambitions is the 
regular review of progress made towards the agreement’s goal, or the global stocktake which 
takes place every five years (Falkner 1114-1115). However, this regular review relies on 
individual country’s ambitions and there is no tool for amendments which could easily apply 
amplified goals onto other states.  
Conclusions 
 One should not underestimate the power of influential actors, or what we can call key 
negotiating blocs or veto coalitions. Such states, or blocs, have the ability to either improve 
compliance and gain support from other states, or to become an entrenched source of opposition 
effectively preventing a treaty from achieving the strength required to solve an issue. The former 
and latter can both be exemplified by the United States in the case of Montreal and Kyoto, 
respectively. America took the lead on initial ozone negotiations and inspired other states to 
follow suit. Conversely, with Kyoto, by failing to ratify the agreement due to political 
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disagreement they only intensified growing global emissions. With a new administration in the 
White House, proving to be more receptive to international climate action there is hope that 
America can resume its role as a lead initiator. It should also be recognized that in addition to 
renewed international efforts climate efforts have been surging at a much more regional and even 
local level as states and cities have worked within their own powers to mitigate the effects of 
climate change (Kinley 2019, 191). 
 I am not overly pessimistic about Paris or our climate change future, but rather am 
grounded in the reality that if we do not accelerate our NDC and make more serious adjustments 
to Paris by or before the first global stocktake in 2023 we are likely to face a planet is such 
disrepair that no MEA could cure it. This does not mean that Paris cannot and should not be 
acknowledged for being a successful achievement in its own right. After decades of ineffective 
multilateral environmental policy on climate change Paris provides a welcome change, but it has 
not proven nor is it currently on track to be enough to stop climate disaster. While you cannot 
simply implant the blueprints of one successful MEA to another, we can incorporate effective 
institutional design features of Montreal and Kyoto into Paris. There is hope, we still have a 
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